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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a split in the circuits regarding whether and when
agency regulations may establish rights enforceable through 42
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U.S.C. § 1983.1 The District of Columbia Circuit and Sixth Circuit
have held that at least some valid federal regulations may create
rights enforceable through § 1983.2 Concluding that only Congress,
by enacting a statute, may create an individually enforceable right,
however, the Third, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits have held that an
agency regulation cannot create an individual federal right enforceable through § 1983, although some decisions in these circuits have
recognized that valid regulations may help courts interpret, “define,”
or “flesh out” the content of statutory rights.3 Most recently, in 2003,
the Ninth Circuit in Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit4 held that
valid agency regulations alone could not establish individual rights
enforceable through § 1983 because only Congress may establish enforceable rights through statutes, although one judge disagreed in a

1. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2000)); Charles Davant IV, Sorcerer or Sorcerer’s Apprentice?: Federal Agencies and
the Creation of Individual Rights, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 613, 613-14 (discussing split in circuits over whether regulations are enforceable through § 1983); Brian D. Galle, Can Federal Agencies Authorize Private Suits Under Section 1983?: A Theoretical Approach, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 163, 164 n.3, 171-76 (2003) (same); Bradford C. Mank, Suing Under § 1983:
The Future After Gonzaga University v. Doe, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1417, 1460-61, 1465-69
(2003) [hereinafter Mank, The Future After Gonzaga] (same); Bradford C. Mank, Using §
1983 to Enforce Title VI’s Section 602 Regulations, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 321, 346-53 (2001)
[hereinafter Mank, Using § 1983] (same); Todd E. Pettys, The Intended Relationship Between Administrative Regulations and Section 1983’s “Laws,” 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51,
76-80 (1998) (discussing conflicting approaches among the federal circuit courts); Derek
Black, Comment, Picking up the Pieces After Alexander v. Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private
Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L. REV. 356, 363-76 (2002) (same); Recent
Case, Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003), 117 HARV. L. REV.
735, 735 (2003) (same); Sam Spital, Note, Restoring Brown’s Promise of Equality After
Alexander v. Sandoval: Why We Can’t Wait, 19 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 93, 111-20 (2003)
(same); infra notes 2-7, 43, 136-54 and accompanying text.
2. See Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 551 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding FCC
regulations enforceable through § 1983 and stating that “[a]s federal regulations have the
force of law, they likewise may create enforceable rights”); Samuels v. District of Columbia,
770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding HUD regulations enforceable through § 1983
and citing the “force and effect” standard articulated in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S.
281, 301-03 (1979)); see also Robinson v. Kansas, 295 F.3d 1183, 1187 (10th Cir. 2002)
(stating Title VI regulations are enforceable through § 1983); Langlois v. Abington Hous.
Auth., 234 F. Supp. 2d 33, 47-54 (D. Mass. 2002) (holding properly promulgated regulations are enforceable through § 1983, although recognizing that the First Circuit had never
decided issue); Davant, supra note 1, at 614 (identifying the District of Columbia and Sixth
Circuits as having “held that an agency can create an individual federal right”); Recent
Case, supra note 1, at 735 n.3 (citing Loschiavo and Samuels).
3. See S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 78490 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that regulations alone may not create rights enforceable
through § 1983); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1007-12 (11th Cir. 1997) (same); Smith v.
Kirk, 821 F.2d 980, 984 (4th Cir. 1987) (same); Davant, supra note 1, at 614 (identifying
the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits as having held that an agency cannot create an individual federal right); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 735 n.3 (citing South Camden, Harris, and Smith).
4. 335 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2003).
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partial dissent.5 By contrast, in the same year, the First Circuit in
Rolland v. Romney6 acknowledged that regulations by themselves
could not establish enforceable rights, but the court concluded that
an agency’s regulations interpreting a statutory right could clarify
the right so that it is sufficiently definite to be enforceable through a
§ 1983 suit.7
The Supreme Court has never directly answered the question
whether § 1983 suits may enforce valid administrative regulations,8
although several of its decisions have important implications for this
issue.9 In 1980, in Maine v. Thiboutot,10 the Supreme Court held that
a violation of statutory rights may be remedied through § 1983 because the plain meaning of the phrase “and laws” in the statute authorized plaintiffs to bring claims under the statute based on violations of federal statutory rights.11 A crucial issue is whether the
phrase “and laws” in § 1983 includes regulations or only refers to
statutes.12 Additionally, even if regulations are considered “laws” for
purposes of § 1983, there is the further issue of whether agency regulations can establish individual “rights” under § 1983.13
Although the Supreme Court collectively has not answered the
question whether administrative regulations can establish individual
rights that are enforceable when they are only implicit in a statute,
individual Justices have suggested their views on this subject.14 In

5. Compare id. at 935-44 (“[W]e hold that an agency regulation cannot create individual rights enforceable through § 1983.”), with id. at 946-61 (Berzon, J., dissenting in
part) and Recent Case, supra note 1, at 739-42 (criticizing Ninth Circuit’s holding in Save
Our Valley that an agency regulation cannot create individual rights enforceable through §
1983 as contrary to well-established administrative law principles). Judge Berzon agreed
with the majority, however, that the Title VI regulations at issue could not be enforced
through § 1983. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 961-65 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); see infra Part VI.A.
6. 318 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2003).
7. Id. at 48-58.
8. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 936-37; Davant, supra note 1, at 613, 628.
9. See infra notes 10-11, 17-18, 21-22, 24-27, 33-38, 57-59, 61, 64, 66-69, 79-81, 8486, 89-97, 101, 104-05, 107, 109-10, 118, 128-35, 158, 161, 168-72, 176-77, 186, 200-04, 208,
213-14, 225-29, 235, 324-25 and accompanying text.
10. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
11. See id. at 4-8; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 330; Pettys, supra note 1, at
67. Section 1983 has remained unchanged since 1980 and provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute . . . [or] regulation . . . of any State
. . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress . . . .
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) (emphasis added).
12. See infra notes 14-19, 30, 49-57, 66-76, 76, 103-05, 168 and accompanying text.
13. See Davant, supra note 1, at 624; infra notes 14-19, 24-42, 105-06, 116-27, 131-32,
136-37, 139-54, 225-26, 228-29, 287 and accompanying text.
14. See Davant, supra note 1, at 613.
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1983, in Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Service Commission of New York,15
Justice Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, argued that § 1983 could be
used to enforce “all valid federal laws, including statutes and regulations having the force of law.”16 In 1987, in Wright v. City of Roanoke
Redevelopment and Housing Authority,17 the Supreme Court held, in
a five-to-four decision, that the Brooke Amendment to the Housing
Act of 1937 and HUD regulations interpreting the statute could create enforceable rights under § 1983, but the Court left unclear to
what extent it had relied on the regulations alone to reach this conclusion.18 In her dissenting opinion, Justice O’Connor contended that
the majority opinion was “troubling” to the extent that it suggested
or implied that regulations alone could establish enforceable rights
through a § 1983 suit.19
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,20 the Supreme Court, in 1984, stated that courts should give
significant deference to agency regulations that provide a reasonable
interpretation of an ambiguous statute or that fill a “gap” in a silent
statute, at least in those cases in which Congress has delegated to
the agency the authority to issue regulations that carry “the force of
law.”21 Conversely, if a statute has a clear meaning regarding a spe15. 463 U.S. 582 (1983).
16. Id. at 638 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
17. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
18. The Court stated:
The regulations . . . defining the statutory concept of “rent” as including utilities, have the force of law. . . . In our view, the benefits Congress intended to
confer on tenants are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable
rights under Pennhurst and § 1983, rights that are not, as respondent suggests,
beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.
Id. at 431-32 (citation omitted). Additionally, in a footnote, the majority stated: “The dissent may have a different view, but to us it is clear that the regulations gave low-income
tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility allowance and that the regulations
were fully authorized by the statute.” Id. at 421 n.3. Commentators have debated the extent to which the Wright majority relied on the regulations alone in establishing a right to
sue under § 1983. Compare Davant, supra note 1, at 621 (“Although the Wright Court expressed no opinion as to whether the regulation created individual federal rights independent from federal statute, the Justices in the majority may have tacitly assumed that
regulations can create rights.”), Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 343 (“It is not clear
whether the [Wright] majority simply deferred to the HUD regulation as a reasonable interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘rent’ or held that the regulations themselves may establish a private cause of action under § 1983.”), and Pettys, supra note 1, at 74-75 (same),
with Spital, supra note 1, at 116 (“Wright located the alleged right in the statutory provision and then relied upon the implementing regulations to define and interpret that
right.”).
19. Wright, 479 U.S. at 437-38 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Mank, Using § 1983, supra
note 1, at 344-45.
20. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (stating that both courts and agencies are bound by
clear statutory language addressing the precise issue in question); see also Recent Case,
supra note 1, at 741.
21. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44 (stating courts should defer to an agency’s “permissible” interpretation of an ambiguous statute or filling of a “gap” in a silent statute); id.
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cific issue in an agency’s enabling statute, then courts will not defer
to an agency interpretation that fails to follow that meaning because
the agency is bound by that statutory language.22 The Chevron Court
stated:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.23

In 2001, in Alexander v. Sandoval,24 the Court indirectly cast
doubt on the use of regulations to create enforceable rights by holding that there is no private right of action to enforce disparate impact
regulations promulgated under Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.25 The Court concluded that a private right of action must be
based on a clear statement of rights plainly established in the statute
itself and may not arise from regulations alone, declaring that
“[l]anguage in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that
Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right
that Congress has not.”26 The Court suggested that regulations alone
may not establish individual rights, observing that “it is most certainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a
private cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress.
Agencies may play the sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer
at 865-66 (stressing that executive agencies have a more appropriate role than the judiciary in defining ambiguous statutory language or filling in a “gap” in a silent statute because they possess greater substantive expertise than courts and because agencies, unlike
courts, are politically accountable through election of the Chief Executive); United States
v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227-30 (2001) (discussing Chevron); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 612, 625-26 (1996) (describing the presumption established in Chevron
that silence in a statute shows the intent of Congress to leave the act of interpretation in
the hands of the agency in charge of administering the act); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin
E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 833-34, passim (2001) (explaining that
Chevron fundamentally expanded deference of courts to agency interpretations of statutes
by presuming that gaps or ambiguities in a statute reflected implicit congressional intent
to delegate interpretive authority to the agency); infra notes 23, 186-99, 289 and accompanying text.
22. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43 (stating that both courts and agencies are bound by
clear statutory language addressing the precise issue in question); see also Recent Case,
supra note 1, at 741.
23. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 227 (“Delegation of such
authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.”); Rolland v. Romney, 318 F.3d 42, 48 (1st Cir. 2003) (“Where an agency
has been endowed with the power to administer a congressionally created program, as
here, regulations should be given substantial deference . . . .”).
24. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
25. Id. at 291.
26. Id. (emphasis added); Galle, supra note 1, at 165, 170, 177-78 (discussing
Sandoval as adopting a “clear statement rule” for private rights of action).
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himself.”27 Although Justice Scalia refused to apply Chevron deference to agency Title VI regulations prohibiting disparate impact discrimination because the Court had construed Title VI to ban only intentional discrimination, he acknowledged in Sandoval that “regulations, if valid and reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself.”28
In his dissenting opinion in Sandoval, Justice Stevens contended
that Section 60229 regulations could be enforced indirectly under §
1983 even if they could not create an implied right of action directly
because regulations are “laws” within the statute’s meaning.30 Additionally, he argued that the majority’s refusal to defer to the agency’s
Section 602 regulations was contrary to the Court’s Chevron decision.31 Justice Stevens argued, “In most other contexts, when the
agencies charged with administering a broadly worded statute offer
regulations interpreting that statute or giving concrete guidance as
to its implementation, we treat their interpretation of the statute’s
breadth as controlling unless it presents an unreasonable construction of the statutory text.”32
27. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.
28. Id. at 284; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 741.
29. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2000).
30. According to Justice Stevens:
[T]o the extent that the majority denies relief to the respondents merely because they neglected to mention 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in framing their Title VI
claim, this case is something of a sport. Litigants who in the future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only
reference § 1983 to obtain relief; indeed, the plaintiffs in this case (or other
similarly situated individuals) presumably retain the option of rechallenging
Alabama’s English-only policy in a complaint that invokes § 1983 even after today’s decision.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 1, at 367-82 (arguing Title VI disparate impact regulations may be enforced
through § 1983).
31. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
32. Id. at 309 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984)); see also Bradford C. Mank, Are Title VI’s Disparate Impact Regulations Valid?,
71 U. CIN. L. REV. 517, 530 (2002) (arguing that the majority opinion in Sandoval ignored
the Chevron deference principle); Jonathan M.H. Short, “Something of a Sport:” The Effect
of Sandoval on Title IX Disparate Impact Discrimination Suits, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 119, 133 (2002); Black, supra note 1, at 361-62 (arguing agency interpretations of Title
VI deserve deference); David J. Galalis, Note, Environmental Justice and Title VI in the
Wake of Alexander v. Sandoval: Disparate-Impact Regulations Still Valid Under Chevron,
31 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 61, 65, 92-101 (2004) (arguing Justice Scalia’s Sandoval decision was wrong to question the validity of Title VI’s Section 602 disparate impact regulations because they are entitled to deference under Chevron, because the term “discrimination” in Section 602 is ambiguous and disparate impact regulations are reasonable interpretation of statute); Note, After Sandoval: Judicial Challenges and Administrative Possibilities in Title VI Enforcement, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1774, 1781 (2003) (arguing Justice
Scalia’s Sandoval decision was wrong to question the validity of Title VI’s Section 602 disparate impact regulations because they deserve deference under Chevron, because Section
602 is ambiguous and disparate impact regulations are reasonable interpretation and
means to effectuate Section 601’s antidiscrimination requirement).
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In 2002, in Gonzaga University v. Doe,33 the Supreme Court held
that the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act’s34 nondisclosure provisions were not privately enforceable through § 1983.35
The Court concluded that individual rights enforceable through §
1983 are similar to implied rights of action because courts are required to “determine whether Congress intended to create a federal
right.”36 Because the Court held in Sandoval that only Congress can
create implied rights of action, the Gonzaga decision suggests that
only Congress can create rights enforceable through § 1983 and that
regulations alone may not.37 The Gonzaga decision did not directly
resolve, however, whether and to what extent regulations may interpret rights implicit in a statute.38 Unfortunately, the Ninth Circuit in
Save Our Valley read dicta in Sandoval and Gonzaga too broadly in
suggesting the erroneous conclusion that courts may never consider
agency regulations in determining whether rights are enforceable
pursuant to § 1983.
It is not clear whether the Chevron decision or similar deference
principles apply to the interpretation of individual rights enforceable
under § 1983.39 If a regulation goes beyond the explicit language of a
statute to clarify or establish a right that is generally compatible
with the statute’s goals, should courts treat that right as enforceable
under § 1983? In a recent article, Charles Davant argues “that, in the
absence of any indication in the language or legislative history of a
regulation-authorizing statute that Congress intended to create enforceable rights, regulations that purport to create privately enforceable individual rights usually will be contrary to statutory law and
not entitled to deference.”40 Davant contends that fundamental sepa33. 536 U.S. 273 (2002).
34. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000) (providing that educational institutions will not disclose
student records to the public).
35. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287-91; see also Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra
note 1, at 1450-52.
36. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283; see also Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1,
at 1448.
37. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 939 (9th Cir. 2003) (“We believe the Supreme Court’s Sandoval and Gonzaga decisions, taken together, compel the
conclusion we reach today: that agency regulations cannot independently create rights enforceable through § 1983.”); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1467 (“In
light of Gonzaga, the argument that regulations alone may create rights enforceable
through § 1983 is probably untenable because a regulation alone normally cannot provide
‘clear’ and ‘unambiguous’ evidence that Congress intended to establish an individual
right.”).
38. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1467-69.
39. See infra notes 40-43, 197-99 and accompanying text.
40. Davant, supra note 1, at 615. But see Galle, supra note 1, at 165, 177-92, 226-28
(arguing valid agency regulations are laws based on a reasonable interpretation of the
term “laws” in § 1983 and therefore are entitled to Chevron deference); Galalis, supra note
32, at 65, 92-101 (arguing Title VI’s disparate impact regulations are valid laws under §
1983 and therefore are entitled to Chevron deference).
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ration of powers principles give Congress the sole authority to create
individual rights that are enforceable under § 1983.41
By contrast, although acknowledging that special care is required
in evaluating the authority of agency regulations purporting to establish individual rights, this Article argues that courts should defer to
agency regulations that clarify or further define individual rights
reasonably implicit in a statute without contradicting the central underlying principle in Sandoval and Gonzaga that Congress alone
possesses the legislative authority necessary to create individual
rights in a statute.42 The First Circuit’s Romney decision is a good
example of a court using agency regulations to clarify the scope of a
right that Congress clearly intended to create in a statute, but appropriately chose to delegate the details of its implementation to an
agency.43 As Parts VI and VII demonstrate, where Congress mandates or clearly implies that it is delegating to an agency the authority to issue regulations implementing an individual right that Congress intends to create on behalf of a class of individuals, then the
agency’s interpretation of the statutory “rights” contained in its regulations are presumptively enforceable through § 1983.44
II. SECTION 1983 SUITS AND “FEDERAL LAW”
A. History of “and Laws” in § 1983 Suits
Section 1983 has its origins in the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the Ku
Klux Klan Act, which created a private right of action for persons
who “under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage of any State” were denied constitutional rights, especially
due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment.45 The main purpose of the statute was to protect African Americans from the attempt of former Confederates to reassert
white supremacy in several southern states by denying African
Americans many legal rights.46 The 1871 statute protected only con41. See Davant, supra note 1, at 615-16, 633-41, 645-48; supra notes 1-3, 8, 13-14, 16,
18-19 and accompanying text; infra notes 55-56, 58, 61, 83, 85-88, 93-95, 107, 155, 185,
191, 196, 200 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 157-349 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Part VI.B.
44. See infra notes 255-339 and accompanying text.
45. See Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (2000)); Lisa E. Key, Private Enforcement of Federal Funding Conditions Under §
1983: The Supreme Court’s Failure to Adhere to the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 29
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 283, 303-04 (1996); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at
1427; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 327; see also Pettys, supra note 1, at 51, 54-61
(discussing the origin of § 1983); Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga:
Laying the Seeds of a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1838, 1841
n.20 (2003).
46. See Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1427; Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 1, at 327; Pettys, supra note 1, at 51-61, 67-68 (discussing the origin of § 1983).
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stitutional rights and did not mention rights protected by federal
law.47
However, in 1874, Congress, as part of a comprehensive revision
of existing statutes, added the phrase “and laws” to section 1 of the
Civil Rights Act.48 There is no explicit legislative history explaining
whether Congress intended the addition of the “and laws” language
to change the meaning of the statute.49 This revised statute is the basis for the current 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides, in relevant part,
as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .50

Commentators have long debated whether Congress’s addition of
the phrase “and laws” changed the meaning of the statute to include
enforcement of statutory rights.51 Proponents of the “Consistency
Theory” argue that the language “and laws” must be read together
with other provisions in the Civil Rights Act to limit the term “law”
to only laws protecting equal rights.52 Conversely, proponents of the
“No Modification Theory” narrowly interpret the addition of “and
laws” as only a clarification of the 1871 statute’s existing protection

47. Key, supra note 45, at 304; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 327; Pettys, supra note 1, at 57.
48. Key, supra note 45, at 304-05; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 327; Pettys,
supra note 1, at 57-60.
49. See Key, supra note 45, at 305 (describing the legislative history of 1874 amendment to § 1983 as unhelpful); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1427
(same); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 327 (same); Pettys, supra note 1, at 59-60 &
n.59 (discussing the absence of legislative history explaining the addition of “and laws” language in § 1983). Compare Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of
Federal Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 398-409 (1982) (arguing that the 1874 legislative history is consistent with the conclusion that Congress intended § 1983 to reach all violations
of federal law), with Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 16 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he legislative history unmistakably shows that the variations in phrasing introduced
in the 1874 revision were inadvertent . . . .”).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
51. Key, supra note 45, at 306-13 (discussing the debate concerning various interpretations of “and laws” in § 1983); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1427-28
(same); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 327-28 (same).
52. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 623-37 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the legislative history of § 1983 demonstrates that the
phrase “and laws” refers only to civil rights legislation and not federal statutes in general);
Key, supra note 45, at 306-07 (discussing “Consistency Theory” interpretation of “and
laws” in § 1983); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1427; Mank, Using §
1983, supra note 1, at 327-28.
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for constitutional rights.53 Finally, proponents of the “Plain Language
Theory” contend that the term “and laws” includes all federal statutes and perhaps other federal laws as well.54
Before 1961, there were relatively few § 1983 cases.55 From the
nineteenth century until 1961, courts narrowly construed § 1983
claims, limiting them to civil rights cases alleging violations of federal constitutional rights, especially deprivation of the right to make
contracts or purchase property.56 In dicta, the Supreme Court suggested in 1900 that the phrase “and laws” in the statute was limited
to civil rights cases, and the Court did not clarify that issue for several decades.57
In 1961, the Supreme Court in Monroe v. Pape58 reinvigorated the
statute by holding that § 1983 allowed a plaintiff alleging injury
caused by the unconstitutional action of police officers to sue for
damages in federal court because their actions were “under color of”
law even if their actions also violated state law, and it also indicated
that § 1983 could remedy a wide range of state violations of federal
constitutional rights.59 During the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme
Court allowed a broad range of suits pursuant to § 1983 and declared
that courts should construe § 1983 “generously” to advance its broad

53. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 16 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“[T]he legislative history
unmistakably shows that the variations in phrasing introduced in the 1874 revision were
inadvertent . . . .”); Key, supra note 45, at 307-08 (discussing “No Modification Theory” interpretation of “and laws” in § 1983); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at
1427 (same); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 328 (same).
54. Key, supra note 45, at 308-13 (discussing and supporting “Plain Language Theory” interpretation of “and laws” in § 1983); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1,
at 1427-28; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 328, 339-52 (discussing whether the
phrase “and laws” in § 1983 allows enforcement of valid federal regulations); Sunstein, supra note 49, at 398-409 (supporting “plain language” interpretation that “and laws” in §
1983 applies to all violations of federal law).
55. See MICHAEL G. COLLINS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN A NUTSHELL 5 (1997) (stating that some authorities estimate fewer than two dozen § 1983 cases from 1870s until
1920s); Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1842 (stating the same proposition and also
stating that § 1983 was infrequently used until 1960s).
56. See Davant, supra note 1, at 617-19; Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 184143 (stating that federal courts interpreted § 1983 narrowly until 1960s).
57. For instance, in Holt v. Indiana Manufacturing Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900), the Supreme Court concluded that federal jurisdiction was generally limited to constitutional and
civil rights claims and suggested in dicta that “and laws” in § 1983 was limited to civil
rights laws. See id. at 72-73; Key, supra note 45, at 314 (“Following Holt [in 1900], the Supreme Court was silent on the question of the proper interpretation of the ‘and laws’ language for several decades.”); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 328 (observing that almost all pre-1980 § 1983 suits raised constitutional claims); Pettys, supra note 1, at 52
(same); Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1841-42 (stating that federal courts narrowly interpreted § 1983 until 1960s).
58. 365 U.S. 167, 183-87 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978).
59. Id.; see also Davant, supra note 1, at 619; Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at
1842.
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remedial goals.60 During the 1960s and 1970s, a few Supreme Court
decisions suggested that a § 1983 suit might be based on a statutory
right violation, but none of these cases clearly resolved the question
because they focused on constitutional claims.61
By the late 1970s, more plaintiffs began filing § 1983 suits alleging statutory violations because the underlying substantive statutes
did not contain an explicit private right of action.62 From 1964 until
the late 1970s, the Supreme Court and lower courts had liberally
construed implied private rights of action that allowed plaintiffs to
file statutory suits even if a statute did not contain an explicit remedy for individual suits; often, such statutes only explicitly allowed,
for instance, suits by federal administrative agencies.63 By the late
1970s, however, the Supreme Court began restricting implied private
right of action suits by demanding that plaintiffs demonstrate that
Congress intended to allow suits by private plaintiffs.64 It was most
60. See, e.g., Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 639 (1980) (“As remedial legislation, §
1983 is to be construed generously to further its primary purpose.”); Monell v. Dep’t of Soc.
Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 700-01 (1978) (stating that § 1983 was “intended to provide a remedy,
to be broadly construed, against all forms of official violation of federally protected rights”);
Recent Case, supra note 1, at 742; infra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
61. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675 (1974) (stating in dicta that “[i]t is,
of course, true that Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970), held that suits in federal court
under § 1983 are proper to secure compliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act
on the part of participating States.”); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 829-30
(1966) (citing Monroe and stating in dicta that an individual has cause of action under §
1983 “not only for violations of rights conferred by federal equal civil rights laws, but for
violations of other federal constitutional and statutory rights as well”); Davant, supra note
1, at 619 (observing that “the Court in the 1970s began to assume, without discussion, that
plaintiffs could use § 1983 to enforce provisions of the Social Security Act”); Key, supra
note 45, at 313-18; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1428; Mank, Using §
1983, supra note 1, at 328 & n.48.
62. See Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1842-43.
63. See, e.g., Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970) (implying a private right of action
in Social Security Act of 1935, as amended in 1967); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544 (1969) (implying a private right of action in Voting Rights Act of 1965); Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967) (implying a private right of action
in the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (implying a private right of action in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Key, supra note 45, at
294 (describing the effect of Borak on private rights of action); Bradford C. Mank, Is There
a Private Cause of Action Under EPA’s Title VI Regulations?: The Need to Empower Environmental Justice Plaintiffs, 24 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 25-27 (1999) [hereinafter Mank,
Private Right] (demonstrating that the Supreme Court or lower courts from 1964 until late
1970s often found implied private rights of action in federal statutes); Mank, The Future
After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1423; Michael A. Mazzuchi, Note, Section 1983 and Implied Rights of Action: Rights, Remedies, and Realism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1062, 1073-74
(1992) (observing that between 1964 and 1975 the Supreme Court took an expansive approach to private rights of action). But see Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence of Implied Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 861, 866-67 & nn.32, 34 (1996) (arguing that courts were reluctant before 1975 to imply private rights of action, except perhaps in securities area).
64. See Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979)
(“[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted . . . .”); id. at 19, 23-24; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
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likely because of new restrictions on implied right of action suits that
plaintiffs instead began filing § 1983 suits for alleged statutory violations.65
B. Statutory § 1983 Suits: Thiboutot
It was not until 1980, when the Supreme Court held, for the first
time, in Maine v. Thiboutot,66 that the term “and laws” in § 1983 included a broad range of federal statutory violations.67 After finding
the statute’s legislative history inconclusive, the Court broadly interpreted the plain meaning of the term “laws” in § 1983 to include all
federal laws, rather than just the Constitution and civil rights statutes.68 Thus, the Court held that plaintiffs may use § 1983 to enforce
both constitutional and federal statutory rights, but it did not specifically address whether regulations are enforceable.69
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist, contended that § 1983’s legislative
history demonstrated that Congress intended the phrase “and laws”
to apply only to equal rights statutes.70 Additionally, Powell main560, 578 (1979) (“The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether
this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted
into law.”); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979) (noting that Cort states the “criteria through which [congressional] intent could be discerned”); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975) (imposing four-part test for deciding whether to imply a private right of action, with
congressional intent being one factor). See generally Key, supra note 45, at 294-96 (explaining the evolution of the Court’s private right of action jurisprudence); Mank, The Future
After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1423-25; Mank, Private Right, supra note 63, at 31-32, 4446 (arguing that the Supreme Court in 1979 made congressional intent the main factor in
determining whether to imply private right of action); Stabile, supra note 63, at 868-71
(arguing that the Supreme Court beginning in 1979 began shifting away from four-factor
Cort test to “an exclusive reliance on legislative intent”).
65. Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1842-43.
66. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
67. Id. at 4-8; see also Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1430 (discussing Thiboutot’s “plain meaning” interpretation of “and laws” in § 1983); Mank, Using §
1983, supra note 1, at 330 (same); Pettys, supra note 1, at 52 (same).
68. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4-8 (rejecting the argument that “the phrase ‘and laws’
should be read as limited to civil rights or equal protection laws”); Mank, The Future After
Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1430 (explaining that the Thiboutot decision concluded that “and
laws” in § 1983 refers to federal statutory rights in general and not just civil rights laws);
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 330 (same); Pettys, supra note 1, at 67 (same); Recent
Case, supra note 1, at 742 (same); infra notes 69-77 and accompanying text.
69. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4-8; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 330 (explaining
that the Thiboutot decision concluded that “and laws” in § 1983 refers to most federal
statutory rights, as well as constitutional rights); Pettys, supra note 1, at 67 (same).
70. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 14-22 & 19 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting) (contending that the
legislative history of the phrase “and laws” supports limiting it to civil rights laws); see also
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 623-37 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the legislative history of § 1983 demonstrates that the phrase “and
laws” refers only to civil rights legislation and not federal statutes in general); Mank, The
Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1429-30 (discussing Justice Powell’s interpretation
in Thiboutot and Chapman that the “and laws” language in § 1983 refers only to civil
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tained that the majority’s decision did not consider the financial impacts on state and local officials resulting from broad § 1983 liability
for violations of federal grant-in-aid programs that now funded numerous state programs, often referred to as Spending Clause legislation.71 During the 1960s, the federal government rapidly expanded
Spending Clause programs that provided money to state agencies to
provide welfare benefits to individuals, but in exchange it also imposed numerous requirements on states to provide a minimum level
of care for beneficiaries.72 Because the growth of these programs led
to an increasing number of beneficiaries and various social movements during the 1960s and 1970s, poor people became more willing
to challenge the government73 and many beneficiaries began filing
suits against states.74 Notably, the Thiboutot decision allowed a recipient of Aid to Families with Dependent Children to use § 1983 to
sue a state for allegedly violating federal welfare policy.75 Because
suits against state and local programs would give federal courts “unprecedented authority to oversee state actions,” Justice Powell argued that the majority’s broad reading of § 1983 jurisdiction “creates
a major new intrusion into state sovereignty under our federal system.”76 The fear that § 1983 suits often intrude on state governments
and thus interfere with federalist concerns likely explains recent decisions, such as Sandoval and Gonzaga, that have restricted such
suits.77

rights legislation); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 329-30 (same); Pettys, supra note
1, at 52, 67-68 (same).
71. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 22-37 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also Key, supra note 45,
at 323-24 (discussing Justice Powell’s concerns in Thiboutot about the majority decision’s
financial impact on state and local governments); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra
note 1, at 1429-31 (same); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 329-30 (same); Pettys, supra note 1, at 67-68 (discussing Justice Powell’s Thiboutot opinion).
72. See Key, supra note 45, at 313-18; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1,
at 1428; Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Standards
in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600,
619-23 (1972) (discussing frequent state failures to comply with federal grant-in-aid requirements and reasons for “less than total success”).
73. See Key, supra note 45, at 314; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at
1428; Tomlinson & Mashaw, supra note 72, at 600 (stating that federal outlays for aid programs increased tenfold from 1951 until 1971, from $2.4 billion to $27.6 billion); SambergChampion, supra note 45, at 1843 n.27 (explaining growth in federal aid programs to
states as one factor in increased § 1983 suits by individuals against states).
74. See Key, supra note 45, at 314; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at
1428; Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1843 n.27.
75. 448 U.S. at 3.
76. Id.; see also Key, supra note 45, at 323-24 (discussing Justice Powell’s concerns in
Thiboutot about the majority decision giving federal courts too great a role in supervising
state and local governments); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1429-31
(same); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 329-30 (same).
77. See Galle, supra note 1, at 166, 170, 192-93 (suggesting the Supreme Court has
read rights enforceable through § 1983 narrowly because of federalism concerns, but arguing that § 1983 suits are compatible with federalism); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga,
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C. The Standard for § 1983 Statutory Suits
Since the Thiboutot decision, a series of Supreme Court cases has
established standards for when a plaintiff may bring a § 1983 suit to
enforce federal statutory rights.78 To understand how the Supreme
Court has defined rights in § 1983 cases, it is helpful to first examine
how the Court has defined them in private right of action cases. In
Cort v. Ash,79 a case involving an implied right of action and not a §
1983 suit, the Court stated that the existence of a federal substantive
right depended upon whether the person claiming the right was “one
of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.”80 The
Court considered the question whether a statute created a “federal
right” to be the first step in its four-step analysis of whether a statute created a private right of action.81 Subsequently, in his dissenting
opinion in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n,82 Chief Justice
Rehnquist maintained that in § 1983 suits, the Court should use the
same analysis of “federal rights” as it had in the Cort decision.83 In
California v. Sierra Club,84 another private right of action case, the
Court explained that a “general ban . . . designed to benefit the public
at large” did not create individual federal rights but that a provision
“created for the especial benefit of a particular class” does create enforceable rights.85
Under Cort’s especial-benefit-of-a-particular-class test, a large
number of regulations arguably could create individual federal rights
because numerous “regulations are promulgated for the especial
benefit of a particular class of persons.”86 For example, Congress and
agencies intended Title VI regulations to especially benefit racial and
ethnic minorities,87 and they intended Title IX regulations to provide

supra note 1, at 1429-31 (same); Samberg-Champion, supra note 45, at 1841-42 (“Section
1983 jurisprudence has always been driven more by judicial policy decisions about federal
courts’ proper role in policing states than by pure statutory interpretation . . . .”).
78. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Wilder v. Va. Hosp.
Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 520-21 (1990); Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493
U.S. 103, 106-07 (1989); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1436-45 (discussing Supreme Court’s evolving § 1983 jurisprudence prior to Gonzaga).
79. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
80. Id. at 78 (quoting Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
81. Id.
82. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
83. See id. at 525-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); see also Davant, supra note 1, at
631 & n.114.
84. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
85. Id. at 294-95; see also Davant, supra note 1, at 631 (quoting Sierra Club, 451 U.S.
at 294-95).
86. Davant, supra note 1, at 631-32 (listing examples).
87. Id. Section 601 of Title VI provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
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special benefits for women.88 However, the Sandoval decision has restricted private right of action suits by requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that Congress intended to allow such suits.89
Influenced by its approach in implied right of action cases, the
Court eventually began to define enforceable rights under § 1983 as
mandatory obligations to provide specific benefits to a special class of
persons.90 In determining whether a plaintiff may enforce a federal
statute by filing suit under § 1983, a court initially assessed whether
a plaintiff’s complaint alleges the violation of specific, not merely
precatory, “federal right[s]” in a statute, whether the statute indicates that those specific rights are intended for the benefit of individuals including the plaintiff, and whether those rights are capable
of judicial enforcement.91 To determine whether a federal statute establishes specific and individually enforceable federal rights, the Supreme Court in Blessing v. Freestone used a three-part test:
First, Congress must have intended that the provision in question
benefit the plaintiff. Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so “vague and
amorphous” that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.
Third, the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States. In other words, the provision giving rise to the
asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.92

Federal financial assistance.” Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78 Stat.
252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2000)). Section 602 of Title VI states in part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal
financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to
effectuate the provisions of section [601] with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall
be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the
financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1; see also Davant, supra note 1, at 631; Bradford C. Mank, Title VI, in
THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: THEORIES AND PROCEDURES TO ADDRESS
DISPROPORTIONATE RISKS 23-25 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1999); James H. Colopy, Note,
The Road Less Traveled: Pursuing Environmental Justice Through Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 125, 152-55 (1994).
88. Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” Pub.
L. No. 92-318, § 901, 86 Stat. 373 (1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681a (2000)); Davant, supra note 1, at 631-32; Black, supra note 1, at 377 n.148; see also H.R. REP. NO. 92-554, at
51-52 (1971) (discussing types of discriminatory practices against women that Congress intended Title IX to redress).
89. See infra Part V.A.
90. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text.
91. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106-07 (1989);
Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1436; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1,
at 332-33; Pettys, supra note 1, at 68-69.
92. Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997) (citations omitted); see Mank,
Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 332-33.
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The Blessing three-part test is somewhat narrower than the original
Cort test.93 “[A] right exists when the language of a law requires the
government to provide an unambiguous benefit to a particular person.”94 If a federal statutory right meets the three-part test, there is a
strong rebuttable presumption that a plaintiff may use § 1983 to enforce that right.95
Even when the plaintiff had asserted a federal right, however, the
Supreme Court, in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Ass’n,96 created an exception to Thiboutot by holding
that a § 1983 suit based on a statutory right may not proceed if a defendant shows that Congress intentionally denied a remedy under §
1983, either expressly or impliedly, by providing a thorough enforcement scheme for the purpose of protecting a federal right.97 The Sea
Clammers Court rejected the plaintiff’s § 1983 suit because the two
federal environmental statutes at issue, the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act98 and the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries
Act,99 contained “unusually elaborate” enforcement mechanisms that
authorized private citizens to bring injunctive actions after giving
sixty days notice to the United States Environmental Protection
Agency, the state, and the alleged violator.100 Subsequent decisions
have limited the Sea Clammers exception to statutory § 1983 suits by
clarifying that a defendant bears a heavy burden of proof to establish
that a statute’s remedy and enforcement scheme are so comprehensive that a court must presume that Congress did not intend to allow
a separate remedy in a § 1983 suit. In Livadas v. Bradshaw, the
Court declared that “apart from [some] exceptional cases, § 1983 re-

93. Davant, supra note 1, at 632; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 332-33.
94. Davant, supra note 1, at 632.
95. Blessing, 520 U.S. at 341; Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 520 (1990) (explaining that courts “do not lightly conclude that Congress intended to preclude reliance on
§ 1983 as a remedy for the deprivation of a federally secured right”) (quoting Wright v. City
of Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 497 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1987) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1436;
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 334.
96. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
97. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 106 (1989); Sea
Clammers, 453 U.S. at 20; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1437-38;
Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 334-36.
98. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000)).
99. Pub. L. No. 92-532, 86 Stat. 1052 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§
1401-45 (2000)).
100. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 13; see also Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra
note 1, at 1437-38 (discussing Sea Clammers); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 335
(same); Lisa L. Frye, Note, Suter v. Artist M. and Statutory Remedies Under Section 1983:
Alteration Without Justification, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1171, 1181-82 (1993) (same); Michael A.
Zwibelman, Comment, Why Title IX Does Not Preclude Section 1983 Claims, 65 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1465, 1468 n.18 (1998) (same).
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mains a generally and presumptively available remedy for claimed
violations of federal law.”101
All three prongs of the Blessing test imply that any right at issue
must ultimately derive from congressional intent as expressed in a
statute. The Blessing standard does not specifically address the role
that regulations may play in defining statutory rights. Two important issues were left unresolved: (1) how explicitly must a statute
create a right and (2) to what extent may a regulation help to define
an implicit statutory right so that it is enforceable under § 1983?
Part V.B examines whether the Court’s Gonzaga decision has clarified these issues.102
III. THE SPLIT IN THE CIRCUITS OVER WHETHER FEDERAL
REGULATORY RIGHTS ARE ENFORCEABLE UNDER § 1983
A key issue is whether the term “and laws” in § 1983 includes not
only federal statutory rights but also “rights” contained in federal
agency regulations. In his 1983 Guardians dissent, Justice Stevens
argued that Thiboutot’s holding that “and laws” includes federal
statutory rights “applies equally to administrative regulations having the force of law.”103 When he used the term “regulations having
the force of law,” Justice Stevens was most probably referring to his
majority opinion in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, a 1979 decision that did
not involve § 1983.104 In summary, the Chrysler Court held that
regulations may have “the force and effect of law” if: (1) they are
substantive rules affecting individual rights and obligations, and
not merely interpretive rules or general policy statements; (2)
Congress has granted “quasi-legislative” power to the agency; and
(3) the agency has complied with applicable procedures such as the
Administrative Procedure Act.105

If regulations can ever create rights enforceable under § 1983, regulations would have to meet these three requirements.106 Unfortu101. 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 334.
102. See infra notes 234-54 and accompanying text.
103. Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 638 n.6 (1983)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
104. 441 U.S. 281 (1979); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 341 (discussing Justice
Stevens’s reference in Guardians to regulations having “force of law” as referring to his
earlier Chrysler decision); Pettys, supra note 1, at 72 (same).
105. Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 341 (discussing Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-04,
308, 312-15 (quoting 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (d))); Pettys, supra note 1, at 72 (same); see also
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2000).
106. See Samuels v. District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“At least
where Congress directs regulatory action, we believe that the substantive federal regulations issued under Congress’ mandate constitute ‘laws’ within the meaning of section
1983.”); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 347-48 (discussing District of Columbia Circuit’s analysis in Samuels that regulations having force of law are enforceable under §
1983).
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nately, the Court has never directly addressed whether Justice Stevens’s analysis, that regulations having the force of law may establish rights enforceable through § 1983, is correct.107
A. Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority
In Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority,108 the Supreme Court considered both specific Department of
Housing and Urban Redevelopment (HUD) regulations109 and more
general statutory language in holding that low-income tenants in a
municipal housing project could bring a § 1983 action against Roanoke’s public housing authority.110 The plaintiffs contended that the
city’s housing authority violated the Brooke Amendment to the Housing Act of 1937,111 which set “a maximum percentage of income that
public housing tenants should pay as rent.”112 The plaintiffs argued
that the Roanoke Housing Authority violated the Brooke Amendment by failing to include a reasonable amount for utility use in determining a tenant’s rent, despite relevant HUD regulations defining
the statutory term “rent” to include reasonable utility payments.113
Justice White’s majority opinion, which was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, agreed with the plaintiffs
that courts should defer to HUD’s interpretation of the definition of
rent in the statute.114 The Court stated that the Brooke Amendment
and relevant HUD regulations established enforceable rights under §
1983:
[R]espondent asserts that neither the Brooke Amendment nor the
interim regulations gave the tenants any specific or definable
rights to utilities, that is, no enforceable rights within the meaning
of § 1983. We perceive little substance in this claim. The Brooke
Amendment could not be clearer: as further amended in 1981, tenants could be charged as rent no more and no less than 30 percent
of their income. This was a mandatory limitation focusing on the
107. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 936-37 (9th Cir. 2003); Davant, supra note 1, at 613, 628.
108. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
109. Id. at 419, 420 & n.3, 421 & n.4, 422.
110. See id. at 431-32; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1462-65 (discussing Wright); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 342-43 (same); Spital, supra note 1,
at 115-16 (same).
111. Wright, 479 U.S. at 419-21 & 420 n.2 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1437a (1982 & Supp. III)).
112. Id. at 419-22; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1462-65 (discussing Wright); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 342-43 (same); Spital, supra note 1, at
115-16 (same).
113. Wright, 479 U.S. at 419-22; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at
1462 (discussing Wright); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 342-43 (same); Spital, supra note 1, at 115-16 (same).
114. Wright, 479 U.S. at 429-32; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at
1462 (discussing Wright); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 342-43 (same); Spital, supra note 1, at 115-16 (same).
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individual family and its income. The intent to benefit tenants is
undeniable. Nor is there any question that HUD interim regulations . . . expressly required that a “reasonable” amount for utilities be included in rent that a PHA was allowed to charge, an interpretation to which HUD has adhered both before and after the
adoption of the Brooke Amendment. HUD’s view is entitled to deference as a valid interpretation of the statute, and Congress in the
course of amending that provision has not disagreed with it.115

It is not clear whether the Court used the HUD regulations to just
interpret the statutory language in the Brooke Amendment or relied
on the regulations as providing additional rights beyond the statutory rights.116 To some extent, the Court may have viewed the regulations as helping to explicate the statutory rights Congress intended
to provide to tenants such as the plaintiffs. The Court stated:
The regulations . . . defining the statutory concept of “rent” as including utilities, have the force of law . . . . In our view, the benefits Congress intended to confer on tenants are sufficiently specific
and definite to qualify as enforceable rights under Pennhurst and §
1983, rights that are not, as respondent suggests, beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.117

Additionally, in a footnote, the majority arguably implied that regulations alone may create rights enforceable through § 1983 provided
that the governing statute delegates broad authority to the implementing agency to define rights implicit in the statute: “The dissent
may have a different view, but to us it is clear that the regulations
gave low-income tenants an enforceable right to a reasonable utility
allowance and that the regulations were fully authorized by the statute.”118

115. Wright, 479 U.S. at 429-30.
116. Compare Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1462-63 (stating that
“the Court’s opinion did not clearly explain whether the HUD regulations simply defined a
right already implicit in the statute’s definition of ‘rent,’ or whether the regulations alone
created rights enforceable though [sic] § 1983”), and Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at
343-44 (“It is not clear whether the majority simply deferred to the HUD regulation as a
reasonable interpretation of the statutory phrase ‘rent’ or held that the regulations themselves may establish a private cause of action under § 1983.”), with Spital, supra note 1, at
115-16 & n.157 (suggesting that Wright primarily relied on congressional intent and the
statutes in defining rights of tenants, although considering regulations to help understand
congressional intent).
117. Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32 (citation omitted); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga,
supra note 1, at 1462-63 (discussing Wright); Spital, supra note 1, at 115-16 & n.157 (suggesting that Wright used regulations to interpret congressional intent in statute).
118. Wright, 479 U.S. at 421 n.3; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at
1462-63 (suggesting that the footnote in Wright may have relied on regulations to create
rights greater than those in the statute). But see Spital, supra note 1, at 115-16 & n.157
(suggesting that Wright used regulations to interpret congressional intent in the statute
and not to create additional rights).
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Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Wright, which was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia, argued
that regulations alone may not establish enforceable rights under §
1983 because only Congress, in a statute, may create such an individual right.119 She observed that the majority’s opinion did not
clearly articulate whether the HUD regulations created a right implicit in the statutory definition of “rent” or whether the regulations’
definition of rent, which included utilities, by itself established a
right enforceable by the plaintiffs under § 1983.120 While she disagreed with the majority view that either the statute or regulations
at issue created a clear right in favor of tenants, O’Connor was most
concerned with the majority’s implication that regulations might establish rights enforceable under § 1983 despite the absence of any
evidence in the statute that Congress intended to create an individual right on behalf of the tenants. She contended that in § 1983
cases, courts should make the same initial inquiry as they do in implied private right of action cases—that is, to determine whether
Congress intended to establish an individual right in favor of a class
including the plaintiff—because “[w]hether a federal statute confers
substantive rights is not an issue unique to § 1983 actions. In implied
right of action cases, the Court also has asked . . . whether ‘the statute create[s] a federal right in favor of the plaintiff.’”121 Her emphasis
in Wright on the need for evidence that Congress intended to create
an individual right before it could be enforced under § 1983 anticipated the Gonzaga decision’s standard.122 She also argued that the
congressional intent analysis in implied private right of action cases
was also the “key to the inquiry” in applying the Sea Clammers test
for deciding whether a statute’s remedial scheme is so comprehensive
that it precludes an action under § 1983.123 Even assuming arguendo
that the HUD regulations in the case established definite rights in
favor of the plaintiffs,124 she contended that these rights were not en119. Wright, 479 U.S. at 432-33, 437-38, 441 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Key, supra note
45, at 331; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463-64; Mank, Using §
1983, supra note 1, at 344.
120. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 437-38 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Mank, The Future After
Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1462-63; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 343-44; Pettys,
supra note 1, at 74-75.
121. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 432-33 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422
U.S. 66, 78 (1975)); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463; see also Mank,
Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 344. But see Key, supra note 45, at 332-33 (arguing that
Justice O’Connor incorrectly relied on implied right of action cases because “§ 1983 itself
explicitly authorizes private causes of action”).
122. See Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463.
123. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 432-33 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Middlesex
County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 13 (1981)); Mank, The
Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 344.
124. Justice O’Connor contended, however, that the HUD regulations at issue were too
ambiguous in defining the crucial term “reasonable” rent to create valid tenant rights suit-
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forceable under § 1983 because the Brooke Amendment did not demonstrate that “Congress intended to create a statutory entitlement to
reasonable utilities.”125 Justice O’Connor stated:
I am concerned, however, that lurking behind the Court’s analysis
may be the view that, once it has been found that a statute creates
some enforceable right, any regulation adopted within the purview
of the statute creates rights enforceable in federal courts, regardless of whether Congress or the promulgating agency ever contemplated such a result. . . . Such a result, where determination of §
1983 “rights” has been unleashed from any connection to congressional intent, is troubling indeed.126

Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have not elucidated whether or
when regulations may establish or help define individual rights enforceable through § 1983.127 In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass’n,128
the Supreme Court considered implementing regulations and concluded that a statutory mandate requiring states to adopt “reasonable and adequate” reimbursement procedures for Medicaid costs
was sufficiently clear to be enforceable by beneficiaries against
states.129 The Court stated: “As in Wright, the statute and regulation
set out factors which a State must consider in adopting its rates.”130
The Wilder decision did not explain whether the right at issue in the
case was created by the statute alone or the regulations as well.131
However, the Wilder decision appeared to ground the right primarily
in the statutory language and to consider the regulations only as a
secondary factor.132 In Suter v. Artist M.,133 Chief Justice Rehnquist

able for judicial enforcement. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 438-40 (O’Connor, J., dissenting);
Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463 n.317; Mank, Using § 1983, supra
note 1, at 345 & n.178 (citing Wright); Pettys, supra note 1, at 75.
125. Wright, 479 U.S. at 434-37 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Mank, The Future After
Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1463-64; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 344.
126. Wright, 479 U.S. at 438 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
127. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1464.
128. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
129. Id. at 519; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1464.
130. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1464.
131. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1464.
132. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 519-21 (stating that the statute at issue “provides, if anything,
more guidance than the provision at issue in Wright”); Pa. Pharmacists Ass’n v. Houstoun,
283 F.3d 531, 536-37 (3d Cir. 2002) (en banc) (concluding that the Wilder decision paid
more attention to the statute than the regulations at issue); Mank, Using § 1983, supra
note 1, at 346 & n.187 (arguing that because the Wilder Court relied so heavily on the
statute, “Wright remains the Supreme Court’s most direct and important use of regulations to create enforceable rights under § 1983”); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra
note 1, at 1464 (same). But cf. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357 (1992) (“The opinions in
both Wright and Wilder took pains to analyze the statutory provisions in detail, in light of
the entire legislative enactment . . . .”); Spital, supra note 1, at 115-16 & n.157 (suggesting
that Wright primarily relied on congressional intent and the statutes in defining the rights
of tenants, although considering regulations to help understand congressional intent).
133. 503 U.S. 347.
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considered both the statute and the relevant Health and Human
Services (HHS) regulations in determining whether they provided
notice to the state that the plan it submitted to the federal agency, in
order to receive federal funds, established enforceable rights on behalf of the beneficiaries.134 The Court ultimately concluded that the
regulations did not furnish clear notice to states that beneficiary
parents could sue a state that did not comply with conditions in its
plan, but the Suter decision did find the regulations to be relevant in
determining the scope of the rights enforceable under § 1983.135
B. The Split in the Circuits Since Wright
There has been controversy over the meaning of Wright and especially over whether the Supreme Court indicated that a regulation
alone could be enforceable through § 1983. Lower courts have disagreed over whether Wright implied that a regulation alone could be
enforceable through § 1983.136 Based on a broad reading of Thiboutot’s reference to “laws” and of Wright’s use of HUD regulations to
find a right to fair rent, both the Sixth and the District of Columbia
Circuits have held that an agency regulation can create an individual
federal right.137 In 1985, before the Court decided Wright, the District
of Columbia Circuit in Samuels, citing Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,138
stated that valid federal regulations would create a right enforceable
under § 1983, at least where the regulation was issued by the agency
pursuant to an explicit congressional requirement:
While Thiboutot involved a statutory violation, the Court’s broad
analysis of the “laws” clause of section 1983 indicates that section
1983 provides a legal remedy for the violation of all valid federal
laws, including at least those federal regulations adopted pursuant
to a clear congressional mandate that have the full force and effect
of law. Such regulations have long been recognized as part of the
body of federal law, see, e.g., Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 301-03 . . . and
134. See id. at 362-63; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1464-65.
135. Suter, 503 U.S. at 359-63 (analyzing both the statute and regulations in concluding that neither created specific and enforceable right on behalf of parents); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1443-44, 1464-65 (discussing Suter). But cf. Key, supra
note 45, at 339-45 (critiquing the Suter Court’s rationale).
136. See Ceaser v. Pataki, No. 98 CIV.8532 (LMM), 2002 WL 472271, at *2-*3
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (discussing disagreement by courts over whether Wright allows §
1983 claims based on regulations alone or only where “regulation is linked to the federal
statues [sic] authorizing it”); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 342-46 (discussing conflicting interpretations of whether Wright allows regulation alone to establish right enforceable through § 1983); Bradford C. Mank, South Camden Citizens in Action v. New
Jersey Department of Environmental Protection: Will Section 1983 Save Title VI Disparate
Impact Suits?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10454, 10475-76 (2002) [hereinafter Mank, South Camden] (same).
137. See Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn, 33 F.3d 548, 553 (6th Cir. 1994); Samuels v.
District of Columbia, 770 F.2d 184, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
138. 441 U.S. 281, 301-03 (1979).
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Thiboutot expressly held that Congress did not intend to limit section 1983 to some subset of federal laws.139

Citing Wright, the Sixth Circuit in Loschiavo v. City of Dearborn declared: “As federal regulations have the force of law, they likewise
may create enforceable rights.”140 The Sixth Circuit’s broad language
arguably implied that any valid federal regulations alone may create
rights that are enforceable under § 1983.141 The Samuels decision
more carefully and appropriately suggested that an agency regulation may create rights only if Congress has delegated to the agency
the authority to issue rules having the force of law. After Sandoval
and Gonzaga, the Sixth Circuit’s language is too broad, but the
Samuels approach is still valid. Part VI.B demonstrates the validity
of the Samuels approach by analyzing the First Circuit’s decision in
Romney.142
The Fourth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit, the Third Circuit, and
now the Ninth Circuit have narrowly interpreted Wright as enforcing
only statutory rights and relying on the HUD regulations only to interpret statutory rights.143 According to these courts, Wright did not
rely on the HUD regulations to create independent rights enforceable
through § 1983.144 For instance, in Harris v. James,145 the Eleventh
Circuit concluded “that the Wright majority did not hold that federal
rights are created either by regulations ‘alone’ or by any valid administrative interpretation of a statute creating some enforceable

139. Samuels, 770 F.2d at 199 (“At least where Congress directs regulatory action, we
believe that the substantive federal regulations issued under Congress’ mandate constitute
‘laws’ within the meaning of section 1983.”); see also DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-Silas
Mason Co., 844 F.2d 714, 724 n.19 (10th Cir. 1988) (citing Samuels and stating in dicta
that “[i]n at least some instances, violations of rights provided under federal regulations
provide a basis for § 1983 suits”); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 347-48 (discussing
Samuels, Chrysler Corp., and De Vargas). But see S. Camden Citizens in Action v. N.J.
Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 274 F.3d 771, 783-85 (3d Cir. 2001) (arguing that prior cases, including Samuels, did not hold that regulations alone may create rights enforceable through §
1983). The Supreme Court first used the “force and effect of law” test in Chrysler Corp.,
441 U.S. at 301-03, to give greater deference to agency regulations that are issued pursuant to an explicit congressional mandate. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1,
at 1460-61 & n.298.
140. Loschiavo, 33 F.3d at 551.
141. Id. at 548; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1460 & n.297 (citing
and discussing Loschiavo); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 347 (same).
142. See infra notes 303-39 and accompanying text.
143. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 939-43 (9th Cir. 2003); South
Camden, 274 F.3d at 783-90 (interpreting Wright as deciding that the regulation “merely
defined the specific right that Congress already had conferred through the statute”); Harris v. James, 127 F.3d 993, 1008 (11th Cir. 1997); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra
note 1, at 1461; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 348-53 (discussing Harris).
144. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 939-43; South Camden, 274 F.3d at 783-90; Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461; Mank, Using
§ 1983, supra note 1, at 348-53 (discussing Harris).
145. 127 F.3d 993 (11th Cir. 1997).
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right.”146 Courts concluding that regulations may not establish rights
enforceable under § 1983 have usually argued that Congress alone
has the constitutional legislative power to create individually enforceable rights through the constitutionally prescribed process of
enacting statutes.147 According to these courts, the key question is
whether Congress intended to create an individual right in the statute.148 For example, the Eleventh Circuit has stated that regulations
may not independently establish rights under § 1983, but may only
further define or flesh out rights established by Congress in the underlying statute.149
Relying on Supreme Court decisions requiring congressional intent to create an implied right of action, the Eleventh Circuit, in
Harris, determined that congressional intent was also crucial in determining whether a right was enforceable under § 1983:
In our view, the driving force behind the Supreme Court’s case
law in this area is a requirement that courts find a Congressional
intent to create a particular federal right. . . . In light of this focus
[on congressional intent], we reject the Sixth Circuit’s approach—
i.e., finding a “federal right” in any regulation that in its own right
meets the three-prong “federal rights” test. For the same reason,
we also reject the approach labeled “troubling” by the dissent in
Wright—i.e., finding enforceable rights in any valid administrative
interpretation of a statute that creates some enforceable right.150

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that “federal rights must ultimately
emanate from either explicit or implicit statutory requirements.”151 A
regulation may serve as the basis of a § 1983 suit only if there is an
appropriate “nexus” between the right in the regulation and congressional intent to establish an enforceable federal right in the statute
that authorized the regulation. Similarly, the Third Circuit, in South
Camden Citizens in Action v. New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection,152 agreed with the Harris court that regulations
alone may not establish enforceable rights and interpreted Wright as
allowing plaintiffs to use § 1983 to enforce only those rights that
Congress has explicitly included in a statute:

146. Id. at 1008.
147. South Camden, 274 F.3d at 783-90; Harris, 127 F.3d at 1007-08.
148. South Camden, 274 F.3d at 784 (“[T]he Supreme Court [has] refined its analysis
to focus directly on Congress’ intent to create enforceable rights and to confine its holdings
to the limits of that intent.”); Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008-09.
149. Doe v. Chiles, 136 F.3d 709, 717 (11th Cir. 1998); Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008-09;
Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1,
at 348-53 (discussing Doe and Harris).
150. Harris, 127 F.3d at 1008 (citation omitted); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at
348-49.
151. Harris, 127 F.3d at 1009 n.21.
152. 274 F.3d 771 (3d Cir. 2001).
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Clearly, therefore, the regulation at issue in Wright merely defined the specific right that Congress already had conferred
through the statute. There should be no doubt on this point, for the
Court plainly stated that “the benefits Congress intended to confer
on tenants are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as enforceable rights under . . . § 1983, rights that are not, as respondent suggests, beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce.”
Therefore, the Wright Court located the alleged right in the statutory provision and then relied upon the implementing regulations
to define and interpret that right.153

Both Harris and South Camden applied an “unambiguous” evidenceof-congressional-intent standard similar to the one that the Supreme
Court later adopted in Gonzaga.154
IV. UNDER THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, CONGRESS HAS THE
PRIMARY ROLE IN CREATING ENFORCEABLE INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, BUT
AGENCIES CAN PLAY SOME ROLE IN DEFINING THE DETAILS OF THESE
RIGHTS
Davant contends that fundamental separation of powers principles give Congress the sole authority to create individual rights that
are enforceable under § 1983.155 Even if it has the ultimate legislative
authority to establish individual rights, however, Congress may delegate some authority for defining such rights to administrative agencies.156 If the delegation of legislative authority is sufficiently clear,
agencies may play a role in defining a right generally but incompletely defined by Congress.157

153. Id. at 783 (citations omitted).
154. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002) (“We now reject the notion
that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a
cause of action brought under § 1983.”); id. at 290 (“In sum, if Congress wishes to create
new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms—no
less and no more than what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under
an implied private right of action.”); South Camden, 274 F.3d at 786-87 (concluding that
because the regulations at issue went “beyond explicating the specific content of the statutory provision,” they did not confer a “‘federal right’ enforceable under § 1983” because “[t]o
hold otherwise would be inconsistent . . . with the Supreme Court’s directive that courts
must find that Congress has unambiguously conferred federal rights on the plaintiff”);
Harris, 127 F.3d at 1011-12 (stating that test for § 1983 suits was whether there was evidence in the statute that Congress had “unambiguously conferred” upon Medicaid recipients a federal right to transportation enforceable under § 1983); Mank, The Future After
Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1446, 1466 & nn.336-38 (discussing and criticizing unambiguous
evidence standard for § 1983 suits); infra note 258 and accompanying text.
155. See Davant, supra note 1, at 615-16, 633-41, 645-48.
156. See infra notes 168-79, 182, 186-93 and accompanying text.
157. See infra notes 169-79, 186, 192-93, 197-98, 252 and accompanying text.
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A. The Primacy of the Legislative Role
1. The Separation of Powers
In INS v. Chadha,158 the Supreme Court articulated a fairly rigid
demarcation of the powers of the three branches of government: “The
Constitution sought to divide the delegated powers of the new Federal Government into three defined categories, Legislative, Executive, and Judicial, to assure, as nearly as possible, that each branch
of government would confine itself to its assigned responsibility.”159
Although it recognized that the three branches are “not ‘hermetically’
sealed from one another,” the Chadha Court concluded that “the
powers delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifiable.”160 Subsequently, however, the Court has sometimes adopted a
less rigid approach to the separation of powers and acknowledged
some overlapping functions among the three branches, especially in
Mistretta v. United States,161 which involved an unsuccessful challenge to the United States Sentencing Commission. The Mistretta
Court held that Congress had not violated the separation of powers
by placing the Sentencing Commission within the judicial branch, by
delegating to the judicial branch nonadjudicatory rulemaking functions with the aim of helping Congress to establish determinate sentences, by requiring active Article III federal judges to serve as commissioners along with non-judges, or by giving the President the
power to appoint all Commission members and remove them “for
cause” because none of these functions interfered with core judicial
functions and because sentencing involves shared functions within
the three branches.162 The Mistretta decision recognized that there
could be some overlapping of functions among the three branches as
long as no single branch exercised control over another:
Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon
the Branches a degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence . . . .
....
In adopting this flexible understanding of separation of powers,
we simply have recognized Madison’s teaching that the greatest
security against tyranny—the accumulation of excessive authority
in a single Branch—lies not in a hermetic division among the

158. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
159. Id. at 951; see also TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (“Our system of government is . . . a tripartite one, with each branch having certain defined functions delegated to
it by the Constitution.”).
160. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
161. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
162. See id. at 383-412.
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Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked and balanced power within each Branch.163

The Constitution grants the legislative power only to Congress.
Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution states that “[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress . . . which shall
consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.”164 In the steel seizure case, Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, the Supreme
Court interpreted the term “[a]ll legislative Powers” in Article I to
indicate that “[t]he Founders of this Nation entrusted the lawmaking
power to the Congress alone.”165 In TVA v. Hill,166 the Supreme Court
concluded:
[I]t is . . . emphatically . . . the exclusive province of the Congress
not only to formulate legislative policies and mandate programs
and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Congress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided
the order of priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is sought.167

2. Delegation
To understand the issue whether and when regulations may create rights enforceable under § 1983, one must understand the concept of legislative delegation of authority to executive agencies. To
prevent the executive branch from arrogating the legislative function, the nondelegation doctrine, which is based on Article I, Section
7 and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, prohibits Congress from delegating essential legislative decisions to the
agencies.168 However, courts have liberally construed the nondelegation doctrine to allow Congress to delegate authority to an agency as
long as a statute delegating authority to an agency contains an “intelligible principle” that defines the scope of agency authority, including its power to issue regulations.169 In Mistretta,170 the Court upheld
163. Id. at 381.
164. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
165. 343 U.S. 579, 588-89 (1952).
166. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
167. Id. at 194.
168. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“Article I, § 1, of
the Constitution vests ‘[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . in a Congress of the
United States.’ This text permits no delegation of those powers . . . .”); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (“Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative functions with which it is . . .
vested.”).
169. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472-76 (finding intelligible principle in Clean Air
Act’s “adequate margin of safety” standard for setting ambient air quality standards); J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (announcing “intelligible
principle” standard for reviewing delegation of legislative authority and upholding delega-
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congressional authority to delegate extensive quasi-legislative powers to a federal Sentencing Commission that has the discretionary
authority to establish determinate criminal sentences for a wide
range of federal offenses as long as the sentences are within the typically broad range initially established by Congress. The Court also
stated that “this Court has deemed it constitutionally sufficient if
Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public agency
which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”171 The Supreme Court has invalidated a statute for lack of an
“intelligible principle” only two times—both in 1935.172 Because modern courts have often treated the nondelegation doctrine as mere
window dressing lacking any real substance,173 a number of commentators have argued for its reinvigoration, but so far to no avail.174
Although modern courts have not strictly applied the nondelegation doctrine, courts have required agency actions to be based on a
reasonable construction of the statute authorizing the agency to act.
Thus, a regulation is valid only if a statute authorizes the agency to
issue it.175 For instance, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,176 the Sution to Executive Branch of authority to revise tariff duties); Mank, Using § 1983, supra
note 1, at 339-40; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Agency Authority to Define the Scope of Private
Rights of Action, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 1-2, 8, 20-21 (1996); Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation
Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000).
170. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
171. Id. at 372-73 (internal quotation marks omitted).
172. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 541-42; Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan,
293 U.S. 388, 429-30 (1935); J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, The Congressional Competition to Control Delegated Power, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1443, 1459 n.53 (2003); Sunstein, supra
note 169, at 322. Since 1935, the Court has never struck down a statute as an excessive
delegation of legislative authority. See, e.g., Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472-76 (holding that the
Clean Air Act’s delegation of ambient air quality standards to EPA is constitutional and
observing that the Court has not invalidated a statute as lacking an “intelligible principle”
since 1935); DeShazo & Freeman, supra, at 1459 n.53 (“[N]ot once since the 1930s, has the
Supreme Court found a delegation to be so utterly without an ‘intelligible principle’ to
guide the exercise of discretion that it violates the nondelegation doctrine.”); Richard B.
Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 323, 326 n.20 (1987) (“The year
1937 signalled the end of the brief Schechter era during which the Court invoked the delegation doctrine to invalidate broad delegations of power.”).
173. See Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (Berzon,
J., dissenting in part) (“Thus, while it is indisputably true that Congress may not delegate
its legislative power to administrative agencies, in practice this limitation operates to prohibit only the broadest of delegations.”).
174. See, e.g., DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 3-21 (1993) (arguing for revival of nondelegation doctrine); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
131-34 (1980) (same); Theodore J. Lowi, Two Roads to Serfdom: Liberalism, Conservatism
and Administrative Power, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 295, 296-312, 314-18, 321-22 (1987) (same).
175. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979) (stating that “the exercise
of quasi-legislative authority by governmental departments and agencies must be rooted in
a grant of such power by the Congress”); Oceanair of Fla., Inc. v. United States Dep’t of
Transp., 876 F.2d 1560, 1565 (11th Cir. 1989) (“An administrative agency . . . is a creature
of Congress and has no authority beyond that granted by Congress.”); Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 1, at 339; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
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preme Court stated: “The rulemaking power granted to an administrative agency charged with the administration of a federal statute is
not the power to make law. Rather, it is ‘the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the
statute.’”177 If a regulation is inconsistent with the authorizing statute’s authority, then the invalid regulation could not create any valid
rights or cause of action.178 Furthermore, an agency must issue regulations that are a reasonable interpretation of a statute, or in other
words, not arbitrary and capricious in substance.179
B. Chevron and the Realities of the Administrative State: Agencies
Have the Primary Role in Interpreting Ambiguous Statutes when
Congress Delegates Such Authority to Them
Because of judicial acquiescence to legislative delegation,180 Congress has frequently enacted statutes that establish broad goals and
then delegate extensive authority to an executive agency to determine how to achieve those goals.181 Courts usually allow Congress to
delegate substantial authority to agencies provided that an enabling
statute includes basic governing principles.182 Because statutes often
contain broad goals or delegate considerable authority to an
agency,183 agencies often promulgate regulations to interpret and
help define rights that are only implicit or generally defined in the
enabling statute.184 Although agencies may not exercise full legislaHARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (describing faithful agent theory, which maintains that
courts use judicial review as a method to insure that agency behavior is faithful to statutory mandates).
176. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
177. Id. at 213-14 (quoting Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 74 (1965)) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
178. See Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 339-40; Pierce, supra note 169, at 1-2, 8,
20-21.
179. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
34 (1983).
180. See infra notes 182, 185 and accompanying text.
181. SCHOENBROD, supra note 174, at 3-21 (acknowledging frequency of legislative
delegations, but arguing that broad delegations of legislative power to agencies delegitimize representative governance); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 172, at 1444
(“When passing legislation, Congress routinely delegates considerable discretionary authority to administrative agencies.”); id. at 1452-54; Thomas O. Sargentich, The Delegation
Debate and Competing Ideals of the Administrative Process, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 419 (1987)
(discussing frequent practice of legislative delegation).
182. See generally Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political Accountability and Delegated Power:
A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391 (1987) (discussing debate regarding
legitimacy of congressional delegation of legislative authority to agencies and reporting
that courts have almost invariably approved such delegations).
183. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 172, at 1452-53 (“Hundreds of federal statutes
delegate powers, many sweeping, to administrative agencies.”); infra notes 186-91, 289 and
accompanying text.
184. DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 172, at 1453-54 (“In practical terms, agencies frequently determine the extent to which a law will be binding, and upon whom.”).
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tive authority, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that agency
rulemaking resembles lawmaking and is sometimes quasi-legislative
in nature.185
If a statute is silent or ambiguous about the particular issue in
question, the Supreme Court in its 1984 Chevron decision186 established the principle that courts should defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of that statute, including filling in “gaps” in the
statute, both because agencies usually possess greater substantive
expertise than courts and because the executive branch is politically
accountable.187 Before Chevron, the Court had usually deferred to an
agency interpretation of a statute only where Congress had expressly
delegated authority to an agency “to define a statutory term or prescribe a method of executing a statutory provision.”188 Conversely, if a
statute’s language is clear and specific, a court must reject an agency
interpretation that is contrary to that language.189
The Chevron decision specifically states that Congress may delegate quasi-legislative authority to agencies to fill “gaps” in a statute.190 “The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress.”191 Chevron suggests that in filling such gaps
an agency could, in some circumstances, reasonably clarify or amplify

185. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 953 n.16 (1983) (“To be sure, some administrative agency action—rulemaking, for example—may resemble ‘lawmaking.’ . . . This Court
has referred to agency activity as being ‘quasi-legislative’ in character. . . . [But w]hen the
Attorney General performs his duties . . . he does not exercise ‘legislative’ power.” (citations
omitted)); Davant, supra note 1, at 641-42 (conceding existence of “quasi-legislative authority” in agencies).
186. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
187. Id. at 842-44 (stating that courts should defer to an agency’s interpretation of ambiguous statutory language or of filling in a “gap” in a silent statute if the interpretation is
reasonable); id. at 865-66 (stressing that executive agencies have a more appropriate role
in defining ambiguous statutory language because they possess greater substantive expertise than courts and because agencies are politically accountable through elections, unlike
courts); Manning, supra note 21, at 625-26 (describing the presumption established in
Chevron that silence in a statute shows the intent of Congress to leave the act of interpretation in the hands of the agency in charge of administering the act); supra note 21 and accompanying text; infra notes 188-93, 289 and accompanying text.
188. See United States v. Vogel Fertilizer Co., 455 U.S. 16, 24 (1982) (quoting Rowan
Cos. v. United States, 452 U.S. 247, 253 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Merrill
& Hickman, supra note 21, at 833 & n.2 (2001) (citing cases).
189. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
190. See id. at 843-44; Manning, supra note 21, at 625-26; Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 21, at 833-34, passim (explaining that Chevron fundamentally expanded the courts’
deference to agency interpretations of statutes by presuming that gaps or ambiguities in a
statute reflected implicit congressional intent to delegate interpretive authority to an
agency).
191. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Davant, supra note 1, at 642.
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rights that are only inchoate or implicit in an ambiguous statute or
one that contains obvious gaps.192 The Court wrote:
If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is
an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is implicit
rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of an agency.193

Some commentators have argued that courts should not apply Chevron deference where a statute is silent because such legislative silence does not necessarily reflect congressional intent to delegate
omitted issues to the discretion of agency interpretation and may in
fact reflect a conscious congressional intent not to delegate authority
to an agency; but the Chevron presumption remains good law.194
Courts and commentators have recognized that Chevron’s presumption that agencies may issue rules to fill gaps in ambiguous
statutes requires courts to give considerable deference to agency
regulations interpreting a statute. For example, the First Circuit has
held that “[a]n inquiring court—even a court empowered to conduct
de novo review—must examine the Secretary’s interpretation of the
statute, as expressed in the regulation, through a deferential
glass.”195 Although generally opposed to the idea of agencies defining
rights enforceable under § 1983, Davant acknowledges that Chevron’s gap-filling, or implicit delegation, doctrine suggests that agencies may at least sometimes define rights in ambiguous statutes, including filling a “gap” in a silent statute, that in turn could be enforced through § 1983.196
Arguably, however, the Chevron deference doctrine is limited to
regulations that merely interpret a statutory right and does not apply to regulations that create or “effectuate” rights based on the gen-

192. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44; Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, at 833-34,
passim.
193. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 (footnote omitted); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21,
at 833-34, passim.
194. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, at 844-45 (contending that congressional silence should be assumed to reflect an intent to withhold Chevron deference when
the legal question at issue is “extraordinary”).
195. Strickland v. Comm’r, Me. Dep’t of Human Servs., 48 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1995).
196. Davant, supra note 1, at 642-44 (conceding that the Chevron doctrine suggests
agencies could in certain circumstances fill a statutory gap by defining a right enforceable
through § 1983, but arguing that courts should be very cautious in doing so unless the
statute very explicitly delegates authority to define rights to an agency).

874

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:843

eral goals of a statute.197 Although the Court’s opinion is not completely clear on this point, a narrow view of the Chevron doctrine is
that the deference principle applies to agency interpretations of
statutory rights but arguably not to agency regulations that go beyond a statute to effectuate the statute’s general goals.198 In light of
Sandoval’s insistence that regulations may only interpret rights, but
not create them,199 the narrower view of the Chevron deference doctrine is more defensible today.
C. Recent Chevron Cases: A Recent Trend Toward Less Deference?
Some recent Court decisions have arguably narrowed the Chevron
doctrine—that agencies may fill gaps in statutes—by refusing to defer to agency interpretations of statutory rights that are not contained in a rule, but instead are issued by the agency in a less formal
interpretive statement that is not promulgated with the opportunity
for public notice and comment.200 For example, in United States v.
Mead Corp.,201 the Court narrowed the application of the Chevron
deference doctrine by holding that such deference applies only where
“it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally
to make rules carrying the force of law” and that if an agency issues
an interpretation of a statute without following the public noticeand-comment rulemaking procedures utilized in Chevron, then
courts should apply the less deferential Skidmore standard.202 In
197. See Brianne J. Gorod, Case Comment, The Sorcerer’s Apprentice: Sandoval, Chevron, and Agency Power to Define Private Rights of Action, 113 YALE L.J. 939, 943, 945-46
nn.40-42 (2004).
198. Id. at 946 & n.42.
199. See supra notes 24-25, 28, 37 and accompanying text; infra notes 213-16, 222, 22427 and accompanying text.
200. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226 (2001); Solid Waste Agency of
N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)
(rejecting agency interpretation issued without public notice and comment in preamble to
rule); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000) (limiting Chevron deference to agency actions that have the “force of law”); Davant, supra note 1, at 645-46; Derek
P. Langhauser, Executive Regulations and Agency Interpretations: Binding Law or Mere
Guidance? Developments in Federal Judicial Review, 29 J.C. & U.L. 1, 3 (2002).
201. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
202. See id. at 226-30; Michael P. Healy, Spurious Interpretation Redux: Mead and the
Shrinking Domain of Statutory Ambiguity, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 677-81 (2002) (discussing Mead); Cooley R. Howarth, Jr., United States v. Mead Corp.: More Pieces for the Chevron/Skidmore Deference Puzzle, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 699, 699-702, 707-10 (2002) (same);
Langhauser, supra note 200, at 3, 14-18 (same); Jonathan T. Molot, Reexamining Marbury
in the Administrative State: A Structural and Institutional Defense of Judicial Power over
Statutory Interpretation, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 1239, 1328-36 (2002) (same). A year before
Mead, the Court, in Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 586-88 (2000), had also
limited Chevron deference to agency actions that have the “force of law,” but the majority’s
opinion did not clearly delineate the line between interpretations entitled to Chevron deference and those only entitled to Skidmore deference. See Howarth, supra, at 714-17;
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, at 846-47; Molot, supra, at 1334-35. Thus, Mead is
likely to have more impact than Christensen.
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1944, the Court, in Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,203 stated that where
Congress has not expressly delegated interpretive authority to an
agency, courts should give only limited deference to agency interpretations, depending upon the persuasiveness of that interpretation
and the agency’s degree of expertise.204 The Mead decision is broader
than Skidmore concerning what type of proof might be sufficient to
demonstrate that Congress delegated authority to an agency: “Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an
agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment
rulemaking, or by some other indication of a comparable congressional intent.”205 The Mead decision and some other recent Court decisions suggest a switch by the Court from an expansive Chevron
deference to agency statutory interpretations toward a more critical
inquiry of agency action under the Skidmore doctrine.206 In some
cases, the Court has even refused to defer to an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute promulgated in a rule if the Court believes the interpretation, nonetheless, is unreasonable and contrary
to congressional intent.207
A recent 2004 decision, Alaska Department of Environmental Protection v. EPA,208 however, may portend that the Court is returning
to a more deferential position.209 In Alaska Department of Environ203. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
204. Id. at 137-40; Howarth, supra note 202, at 713-16 (discussing differences between
Skidmore and Chevron deference doctrines); Langhauser, supra note 200, at 11-14 (same);
Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, at 853-56 (same).
205. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227.
206. See id. at 226-30 (concluding that Chevron deference does not apply to an agency
interpretation contained in informal interpretive documents lacking rulemaking status);
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs,
531 U.S. 159 (2001) (rejecting agency interpretation issued without public notice and comment in preamble to rule); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. at 586-88 (2002) (limiting Chevron deference to agency actions that have the “force of law”); Langhauser, supra
note 200, at 3, 14-18 (discussing Mead’s use of Skidmore deference and the implications for
limiting Chevron); Merrill & Hickman, supra note 21, at 856-58 (discussing Supreme Court
cases using the Skidmore deference doctrine and implications for limiting Chevron); Molot,
supra note 202, at 1328-36 (discussing Mead); see also supra notes 200-05 and accompanying text; infra note 207 and accompanying text.
207. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 481-86 (2001) (invalidating an
Environmental Protection Agency regulation interpreting an ambiguous statute because
the interpretation was unreasonable and contrary to congressional intent); FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (concluding that normal Chevron
deference to agency interpretation did not apply because of “extraordinary” circumstances
suggesting Congress did not want the agency to regulate tobacco); Healy, supra note 202,
at 684-86 (discussing the Whitman Court’s conclusion that agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute was not entitled to deference under Chevron); Merrill & Hickman, supra
note 21, at 844-45 (discussing the Brown & Williamson Court’s refusal to apply Chevron
deference and the implications for future cases); Molot, supra note 202, at 1324-28 (criticizing the Brown & Williamson Court’s use of vague “extraordinary” exception to Chevron
doctrine and discussing whether the case portends a narrower application of Chevron).
208. 540 U.S. 461 (2004).
209. See infra notes 210-12 and accompanying text.
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mental Protection, the Court deferred to the agency interpretation of
the Act’s “best available control technology” (BACT) provisions even
though the agency had only issued internal guidance that was not
entitled to Chevron deference, which applies only to valid and duly
promulgated rules published after notice and comment.210 In his dissenting opinion in Alaska Department of Environmental Protection,
Justice Kennedy complained that while the majority had technically
rejected Chevron deference because the EPA had not issued a qualifying regulation, the Court had applied a de facto similar standard.211
Despite Mead, the Court still follows the Chevron deference principle
that courts should defer to a “reasonable” agency interpretation of an
ambiguous or silent statute, at least in cases in which agencies
promulgate their interpretation in a rule issued through notice-andcomment rulemaking and, in Alaska Department of Environmental
Protection, even in a case in which the agency did not utilize rulemaking.212
V. THE IMPACT OF SANDOVAL AND GONZAGA: CONGRESS MUST
ESTABLISH ENFORCEABLE RIGHTS
A. Sandoval: Only Congress Can Create a Private Right of Action
In 2001, in Alexander v. Sandoval,213 the Supreme Court concluded that only Congress may create rights that are enforceable in a
private right of action and that agency regulations purporting to establish broader rights are not enforceable as a private right of action
in federal court. In Sandoval, the plaintiffs claimed that a private
right of action was established through agency regulations prohibiting recipients of federal funds, including state agencies, from engaging in actions that cause disparate impacts to minority groups.214 The
Court had interpreted Title VI’s statutory language to prohibit only
intentional discrimination and not to prohibit disparate impact discrimination so that any right of action against disparate impact discrimination could only arise from the regulations.215 The plaintiffs
contended that the Alabama Department of Public Safety’s policy of
administering its driver’s license examination only in English established a prima facie case of disparate impact discrimination in violation of the relevant Section 602 regulations.216

210. 540 U.S. at 487-93 (holding that agency interpretation in several internal guidance documents is entitled to deference even though Chevron doctrine does not apply).
211. Id. at 517-18 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
212. See supra notes 209-10 and accompanying text.
213. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
214. See id. at 278-79.
215. See infra notes 228-29 and accompanying text.
216. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 278-79.
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In determining whether Section 602 disparate impact regulations
establish a private right of action, the Sandoval Court used its postCort principle that “private rights of action to enforce federal law
must be created by Congress.”217 In determining statutory intent, the
Sandoval Court refused to consider whether a private right of action
would serve Title VI’s purposes or even whether the Congress that
enacted the statute in 1964 assumed that courts would imply a private right of action. The Sandoval Court observed that since its 1975
decision in Cort v. Ash,218 the Court had consistently rejected the
view in its 1964 decision J.I. Case Co. v. Borak219 that “‘it is the duty
of the courts to be alert to provide such remedies as are necessary to
make effective the congressional purpose’ expressed by a statute,”
even when the Court reviewed statutes enacted before the Cort decision.220 Rejecting the respondents’ argument that it should apply Borak’s approach to a statute enacted just after that decision, the
Sandoval Court declared: “Having sworn off the habit of venturing
beyond Congress’s intent, we will not accept respondents’ invitation
to have one last drink.”221
The Court focused on the text of Section 602 in deciding whether
Congress intended to create an enforceable private right of action to
enforce regulations promulgated under Section 602. Applying a textualist approach to statutory interpretation, the Court observed:
“The judicial task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to
determine whether it displays an intent to create not just a private
right but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point
is determinative.”222 The Sandoval Court concluded that “[w]e therefore begin (and find that we can end) our search for Congress’s intent
with the text and structure of Title VI.”223 The Court’s focus on the
statute’s text in determining whether the statute established a private right of action led it to reject the respondents’ argument that
rights might arise from agency regulations.224 The Court announced:
“Language in a regulation may invoke a private right of action that
Congress through statutory text created, but it may not create a right
that Congress has not.”225 The Court emphasized that regulations
alone may not create individual rights, stating that “it is most cer217. Id. at 286.
218. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
219. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
220. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 287-88 (quoting Borak, 377 U.S. at 433).
221. Id. at 287; Bradford C. Mank, Legal Context: Reading Statutes in Light of Prevailing Legal Precedent, 34 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 815, 859-60 (2002); Short, supra note 32, at 128.
222. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
223. Id. at 288; Mank, supra note 221, at 860; Short, supra note 32, at 128-29.
224. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291; Mank, supra note 221, at 860; Short, supra note 32, at
129.
225. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291 (emphasis added); Mank, supra note 221, at 860; Short,
supra note 32, at 129.
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tainly incorrect to say that language in a regulation can conjure up a
private cause of action that has not been authorized by Congress.
Agencies may play the sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer
himself.”226 The Sandoval Court held that “[n]either as originally enacted nor as later amended does Title VI display an intent to create a
freestanding private right of action to enforce regulations promulgated under § 602. We therefore hold that no such right of action exists.”227
However, the Sandoval decision acknowledged that plaintiffs
could still bring a private right of action against recipients alleging
that they had committed intentional discrimination in violation of either Section 601 or “regulations applying [Section] 601’s ban on intentional discrimination.”228 Citing Chevron, the Court stated that
regulations, including those issued under Section 602, were enforceable to the extent that they effectuated the core prohibition against
intentional discrimination in Section 601:
We do not doubt that regulations applying § 601’s ban on intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to enforce
that section. Such regulations, if valid and reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself . . . . A Congress that intends the
statute to be enforced through a private cause of action intends the
authoritative interpretation of the statute to be so enforced as
well.229

1. Justice Stevens’s Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion in Sandoval, Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, argued that the majority’s refusal to defer to the agency’s Section 602 regulations was contrary to
the Chevron doctrine, which requires courts to defer to an agency’s
appropriate interpretation of an ambiguous statutory term such as
“discrimination.”230 Justice Stevens argued, “In most other contexts,
when the agencies charged with administering a broadly worded
statute offer regulations interpreting that statute or giving concrete
guidance as to its implementation, we treat their interpretation of
the statute’s breadth as controlling unless it presents an unreason-

226. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.
227. Id. at 293 (footnote omitted).
228. Id. at 284.
229. Id. (citing NationsBank of N.C., N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S.
251, 257 (1995), and Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843-44 (1984)).
230. Id. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron); Mank, supra note 32, at 530
(arguing that the majority opinion in Sandoval ignored the Chevron deference principle);
Short, supra note 32, at 133.
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able construction of the statutory text.”231 Under Chevron, there is a
good argument that courts should defer to agency interpretations of
Title VI and Title IX because the term “discrimination” in these statutes is ambiguous.232 Justice Stevens contended that the majority
opinion might have little significance because even if there was no
private right of action available to enforce Section 602 regulations,
then a suit under § 1983 could enforce those same regulations indirectly because the standard for enforcing federal rights under § 1983
is broader than the standard for implying private rights of action.233
B. Gonzaga: Congress Must Create Rights Enforceable Through §
1983
Before the Supreme Court’s Gonzaga decision, several decisions
had allowed suits under § 1983 to vindicate federal statutory rights
even when the underlying statute creating the right was not enforceable as a private right of action.234 The Gonzaga Court, however, con231. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 309 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron); Mank, supra
note 32, at 530; Short, supra note 32, at 133.
232. See Black, supra note 1, at 361-62 (arguing that agency interpretations of Title VI
deserve deference because agencies such as the Department of Education possess significant experience and expertise in applying statute); Galalis, supra note 32, at 65, 92-98, 101
(arguing that Justice Scalia’s Sandoval decision was wrong to question the validity of Title
VI’s Section 602 disparate impact regulations because they are entitled to deference under
Chevron since the term “discrimination” in Section 602 is ambiguous and disparate impact
regulations are a reasonable interpretation of the statute); Note, supra note 32, at 1781
(same).
233. Justice Stevens stated:
[T]o the extent that the majority denies relief to the respondents merely because they neglected to mention 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in framing their Title VI
claim, this case is something of a sport. Litigants who in the future wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only
reference § 1983 to obtain relief; indeed, the plaintiffs in this case (or other
similarly situated individuals) presumably retain the option of re-challenging
Alabama’s English-only policy in a complaint that invokes § 1983 even after today’s decision.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 299-300 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 1, at 348-53, 367-82 (arguing that Title VI disparate impact regulations may be
enforced through § 1983).
234. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990) (observing that
whether a § 1983 suit is available presents a “different inquiry” than whether an implied
right of action exists); Mallett v. Wis. Div. of Vocational Rehab., 130 F.3d 1245, 1248-57
(7th Cir. 1997) (determining that a plaintiff could bring a § 1983 claim based on the Rehabilitation Act because it created an enforceable right and did not foreclose such relief but
deciding that there was no private right of action under the act because its language and
legislative history suggested that the statute’s administrative remedy was a more appropriate enforcement mechanism); Chan v. City of New York, 1 F.3d 96, 102-06 (2d Cir. 1993)
(concluding, under the Cort analysis, that the Housing and Community Development Act
did not create a private right of action, but did, based on the Blessing/Wilder analysis, create substantive rights which could be enforced through a § 1983 action); Fay v. S. Colonie
Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 33 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that although the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (“FERPA”) itself does not give rise to a private cause of action, plaintiffs could nonetheless bring suit under § 1983 to enforce rights created by
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cluded that individual rights enforceable through § 1983 and implied
private rights of action are similar. “[W]e . . . reject the notion that
our implied right of action cases are separate and distinct from our §
1983 cases. To the contrary, our implied right of action cases should
guide the determination of whether a statute confers rights enforceable under § 1983.”235 The Court continued:
We have recognized that whether a statutory violation may be
enforced through § 1983 “is a different inquiry than that involved
in determining whether a private right of action can be implied
from a particular statute.” But the inquiries overlap in one meaningful respect—in either case we must first determine whether
Congress intended to create a federal right.236

Accordingly, the Gonzaga Court stated: “[I]mplied right of action
cases should guide the determination of whether a statute confers
rights enforceable under § 1983.”237 The Gonzaga Court held that the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act did not establish individual rights that could be enforced through § 1983 because Congress
intended to give only the Department of Education, and not private
individuals, the authority to bring suit against schools that violated
the statute’s nondisclosure provisions.238
Although the Gonzaga decision has made the congressional intent
test for implied rights of action the initial inquiry in § 1983 cases,239
it is still possible to enforce a federal statutory right through § 1983
even if that right cannot be enforced as a direct private right of ac-

FERPA), overruled, Taylor v. Vt. Dep’t of Educ., 313 F.3d 768 (2002) (overruling Fay in
light of Gonzaga); Keaukaha-Panaewa Cmty. Ass’n v. Hawaiian Homes Comm’n, 739 F.2d
1467, 1470-71 (9th Cir. 1984) (concluding that plaintiffs could bring a § 1983 action because the statute at issue clearly mandated that the trust at issue be established for the
benefit of Hawaiians such as plaintiffs and it did not foreclose a § 1983 remedy, but also
concluding that no private right of action existed under the statute); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1438-42 & n.166; Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 35359; Henry Paul Monaghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the APA, 91
COLUM. L. REV. 233, 246-47 (1991). But see Mazzuchi, supra note 63, at 1064, 1093 (arguing that statutory rights under § 1983 should be limited in the future to cases in which
rights could be enforced through an implied or explicit private right of action, but acknowledging that prior cases have applied a more lenient standard in § 1983 suits).
235. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga,
supra note 1, at 1446-51.
236. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283 (quoting Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9) (citation omitted);
Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1448.
237. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at
1448-51.
238. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 287-91; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at
1450-52. Justice Stevens wrote a vigorous dissent in Gonzaga, which was joined by Justice
Ginsburg, in which he argued that the statute did seek to create rights on behalf of individuals. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 293-303 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mank, The Future After
Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1453-55, 1457-58.
239. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283-86; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1,
at 1448-51.
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tion.240 Under the Gonzaga decision, for both suits asserting a private
right of action and those proceeding under § 1983, a court first examines whether Congress intended, either expressly or by implication,
to establish an individual federal right on behalf of a class including
the plaintiff.241 After the initial Gonzaga inquiry about whether Congress intended to establish a federal right, however, there is a difference in determining whether the remedies are available under a private right of action and a § 1983 suit.242 Under a private right of action, a plaintiff must demonstrate not only that Congress intended to
create a right on behalf of the plaintiff243 but also that Congress intended that plaintiffs have the right to sue to enforce that right.244 By
contrast, in § 1983 cases, under the Supreme Court’s three-part
Blessing test, once a plaintiff shows that Congress intended to establish a right in favor of the plaintiff,245 there is a strong presumption
that the plaintiff may enforce that right because § 1983 itself provides the remedy, unless the narrow Sea Clammers exception applies.246 Because § 1983 provides an “alternative source of express

240. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (“Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.”); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1448-50, 1455-59, 1481-82 (arguing that Gonzaga
changes initial inquiry in § 1983 suits, but not the presumption that federal rights are enforceable by § 1983).
241. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 283-86; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1,
at 1448-51.
242. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at
1455-59, 1481-82.
243. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568, 575, 578 (1979) (“The ultimate
question is one of congressional intent, not one of whether this Court thinks that it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law.”); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1423-25; Mank, Private Right, supra note 63, at 31-32, 44-46
(arguing that beginning in 1979 the Supreme Court made congressional intent the main
factor in determining whether to imply a private right of action); Stabile, supra note 63, at
868-71 (arguing that in 1979 the Supreme Court began “an exclusive reliance on legislative
intent” in determining a private right of action).
244. See Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (stating that the plaintiff has the
burden to demonstrate Congress’s intent to make a private remedy available); Wilder v.
Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 n.9 (1990); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16, 19, 23-24 (1979) (“[W]hat must ultimately be determined is
whether Congress intended to create the private remedy asserted . . . .”); Mank, Using §
1983, supra note 1, at 357-58 (stating that the plaintiff in a private right of action case
must show that Congress intended the remedy to be available to the plaintiff).
245. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340-41 (1997); Mank, Using § 1983, supra
note 1, at 332; supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
246. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (“Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.”); Wilder, 496
U.S. at 508 n.9 (stating Supreme Court has “recognize[d] an exception to the general rule
that § 1983 provides a remedy for violation of federal statutory rights only when Congress
has affirmatively withdrawn the remedy”); id. at 525-26 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (stating that “§ 1983 generally . . . supplies the remedy for vindication of rights arising from
federal statutes”); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1439-41, 1448-50,
1455-59, 1481-82 (arguing that Gonzaga changes the initial inquiry in § 1983 suits, but not
the presumption in Wilder that federal rights are enforceable through § 1983); Mank, Us-
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congressional authorization of private suits,” the separation of powers concerns that require congressional intent to authorize remedies
in a private cause of action are not present in a § 1983 case.247 Although emphasizing that plaintiffs suing under § 1983 bear the same
burden as plaintiffs in a private cause of action suit to show Congress
intended to establish individually enforceable rights, the Gonzaga
Court acknowledged the rule set forth in its earlier decisions that the
plaintiff in the former type of suit does not have to prove that Congress intended to provide individual remedies, stating:
Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 do not have the burden of showing
an intent to create a private remedy because § 1983 generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of rights secured by federal statutes. Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by § 1983.248

Because the Court held in Sandoval that only Congress can create
implied rights of action, the Gonzaga decision’s conclusion that only
Congress may establish federal rights enforceable through § 1983
implies that a regulation alone may not create a right enforceable
through § 1983.249 The Gonzaga Court stated that rights are enforceable by individuals through § 1983 only where there is “clear” and
“unambiguous” evidence that Congress intended to establish an individual right.250 If an agency seeks to create a right in a regulation
alone that is not at all in the underlying statute, then that right
could not meet Gonzaga’s requirement that there must be “clear” and
“unambiguous” evidence that Congress intended to establish an individual right.251
Yet even after Gonzaga, a court might examine agency regulations that interpret statutory language or legislative history to uning § 1983, supra note 1, at 357-59 (discussing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9, and Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in Wilder); Monaghan, supra note 234, at 246-47 (discussing
Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9).
247. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 n. 9 (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v.
Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 300 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra
note 1, at 1439-41 (discussing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9); Mank, Using § 1983, supra note
1, at 357-59 (discussing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9); Monaghan, supra note 234, at 246-47
(discussing Wilder, 496 U.S. at 508 n.9).
248. Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (citation omitted); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1448-49.
249. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461, 1466-69.
250. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 290 (“In sum, if Congress wishes to create new rights enforceable under § 1983, it must do so in clear and unambiguous terms—no less and no
more than what is required for Congress to create new rights enforceable under an implied
private right of action.”); see also id. at 283 (“We now reject the notion that our cases permit anything short of an unambiguously conferred right to support a cause of action
brought under § 1983.”); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1446, 1461,
1466 (discussing and criticizing the unambiguous evidence standard for § 1983 suits).
251. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461, 1466-69.
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derstand whether Congress intended to create a statutory right.252
Because agencies are often involved in Congress’s drafting of a statute that delegates authority to that agency, a court may find agency
regulations useful in providing understanding of congressional intent.253 Although it demanded “clear” and “unambiguous” evidence in
a statute that Congress intended to establish individually enforceable rights, the Gonzaga Court did not purport to overrule the
Court’s earlier Wright decision, which examined agency regulations
in conjunction with a statute to help determine whether an enforceable right existed under § 1983, or the Chevron deference principle.254
VI. AFTER SANDOVAL AND GONZAGA: THE FIRST AND NINTH CIRCUITS
DISAGREE ABOUT WHETHER REGULATIONS CAN HELP INTERPRET
RIGHTS ENFORCEABLE UNDER § 1983
Because neither Sandoval nor Gonzaga clearly addressed the extent to which an agency’s interpretation of statutory rights in regulations is entitled to deference, the lower courts have disagreed about
that issue. The Ninth Circuit in Save Our Valley held that valid
agency regulations alone could not establish individual rights enforceable through § 1983 because only Congress may establish enforceable rights through statutes, although Judge Berzon disagreed
in a partial dissent.255 The Save Our Valley majority did not directly
address the question of Chevron deference, but Judge Berzon’s partial dissent did recognize the importance of that case.256 Conversely,
the First Circuit, in Rolland v. Romney, acknowledged that regulations by themselves could not establish enforceable rights, but the
court appropriately applied Chevron deference principles in concluding that an agency’s regulations interpreting a statutory right could
clarify a right so that it is sufficiently definite to be enforceable in a §
1983 suit.257

252. See id. at 1461-62, 1467-69, 1482.
253. Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory Interpretation ProEnvironmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1283-84 (1996) [hereinafter Mank, Textualist] (explaining the close ties between federal agencies and the legislative process); Mank, The Future
After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461-62 (same).
254. Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1462.
255. Compare Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 935-44 (9th Cir. 2003)
(“[W]e hold that an agency regulation cannot create individual rights enforceable through §
1983.”), with id. at 946-61 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part). See also infra notes 258-59, 268,
270-78 and accompanying text.
256. See infra Part VI.A.
257. 318 F.3d 42, 48-58 (1st Cir. 2003); infra notes 303-39 and accompanying text.
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A. Sound Transit: Following Sandoval and Gonzaga’s Dicta
In Save Our Valley, the Ninth Circuit read Gonzaga as strengthening and supporting the approach in Harris and South Camden that
regulations cannot establish rights enforceable under § 1983 and as
weakening the rationales in Loschiavo and Samuels.258 The Ninth
Circuit held that valid agency regulations alone could not establish
individual rights enforceable through § 1983 because only Congress
may establish enforceable rights through statutes.259 In reaching this
broad conclusion, the Ninth Circuit falsely assumed that Sandoval
and Gonzaga compelled its holding and failed to consider important
principles of administrative law and statutory interpretation, especially Chevron.260
The Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (“Sound
Transit”) proposed to extend an existing rail line between Seattle and
Sea-Tac, Washington, through south Seattle’s Rainier Valley, a predominantly minority neighborhood.261 Although most portions of the
new line were “to be elevated above street level or to be built underground,” Sound Transit decided that the segment running through
Rainier Valley had to run at street level because of cost and other
factors.262 Save Our Valley (SOV), a community group, brought suit
against Sound Transit in federal district court and argued that
Sound Transit’s proposal violated a Department of Transportation
(DOT) disparate impact regulation263 that DOT issued pursuant to
authority under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,264 which prohibits recipients of federal funds from taking actions that have a racially discriminatory effect.265 SOV also contended that this DOT
258. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 936-43 (discussing Gonzaga’s impact on the validity
of Harris, South Camden, Loschiavo, and Samuels).
259. Id. at 935-44 (“[W]e hold that an agency regulation cannot create individual rights
enforceable through § 1983.”); see id. at 943-44; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 735.
260. See Recent Case, supra note 1, at 735; infra notes 270-78 and accompanying text.
261. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 934; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 735.
262. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 934.
263. 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2004).
264. Specifically, the regulation was promulgated under the authority of Section 602 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000d-1 (2000). See 35 Fed. Reg. 10080, 10080
(June 18, 1970). That section provides that “[e]ach Federal department and agency which
is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity . . . is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 2000d of this title with respect
to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability.”
42 U.S.C. §2000d-1.
265. See 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (prohibiting recipients of federal funding from “utiliz[ing] criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting persons to
discrimination because of their race, color, or national origin”). SOV also alleged that
Sound Transit’s plan violated the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 43214370f (2000), the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, and the intentional discrimination portion of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d. See Save Our
Valley, 335 F.3d at 934 n.1. The district court dismissed the National Environmental Policy Act claim and granted Sound Transit summary judgment on the Fair Housing Act
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regulation created an individual right to be free from disparate impact and that this right was enforceable through § 1983.266
In Save Our Valley, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s
conclusion that the DOT regulations could not establish a right enforceable under § 1983 and, therefore, that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment.267 In light of both Sandoval and Gonzaga,
the majority concluded that “agency regulations cannot independently create rights enforceable through § 1983.”268 In Sandoval, the
Supreme Court had focused on the text of Title VI itself, rather than
the implementing regulation, in determining whether the DOT regulation created a private right of action.269 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Sandoval’s emphasis on the statute’s text implied that
“only Congress by statute can create a private right of action.”270 Although acknowledging that Sandoval had dealt only with implied or
private rights of action and had not addressed when individual rights
are enforceable under § 1983, the majority determined that “the
[Sandoval] Court’s reasoning applie[d] equally to both kinds of
rights.”271 Similarly, the majority concluded that Gonzaga “confirmed
that individual rights enforceable through § 1983 and implied private
rights of action are similar in respects relevant to this appeal.”272
Quoting Gonzaga, the Ninth Circuit observed that in both private
right of action cases and § 1983 cases, “courts are required to ‘determine whether Congress intended to create a federal right.’”273 “Since
only Congress can create implied rights of action” under Sandoval,
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Gonzaga “suggests that only Congress can create rights enforceable through § 1983”274 because “rights
enforceable through § 1983, no less than implied rights of action, are
creatures of substantive federal law.”275 The majority concluded that
the Gonzaga decision strongly implied that “the Court’s reasoning [in

claim. Id. The district court also held that the claim brought under Section 601 of Title VI
could stand if SOV could prove intentional discrimination. Id. None of these issues was
raised on appeal. Id.; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 736.
266. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 934-35; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 736.
267. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 935.
268. Id. at 939; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737.
269. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937 (observing that “[t]he [Sandoval] Court rejected the claim, basing its analysis not on the regulation’s text but on the statute’s text”
and citing several examples of the Sandoval Court’s emphasis on the statutory language);
Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s emphasis on Sandoval’s
analysis of statutory language).
270. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s emphasis on Sandoval’s analysis of statutory language).
271. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937.
272. Id. at 938; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737 n.29.
273. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 938 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273,
283 (2002) (emphasis added)); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737 n.29.
274. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 939; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737 n.29.
275. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 938 n.4; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 740.
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Sandoval] applie[d] equally to both kinds of rights”276 and that, “[l]ike
substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to enforce federal law must be created by Congress.”277 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held that enforceable rights “cannot be created by executive
agencies.”278
In a lengthy partial dissent, Judge Berzon disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that regulations can never create rights enforceable through § 1983. Judge Berzon contended that “the majority
opinion demonstrates that it does not understand what a right is,
and how it differs from a right of action.”279 Judge Berzon stated that
“[a]ny analysis of the reach of § 1983 must . . . begin with, and not
lose sight of, the unexceptional proposition that rights are entirely
distinct from any private, affirmative, judicial remedy that may exist
for violation or deprivation of those rights.”280 Judge Berzon argued
that Sandoval had merely required that Congress create any right of
action enforceable in a court but that neither Sandoval nor Gonzaga
had held that Congress alone must explicitly establish rights.281 She
explained that an individual right is simply the legal relationship between two individuals and the state and that administrative agency
regulations almost inevitably define such relationships and rights.282
Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that an agency rule has the
“force and effect of law” only if it “affect[s] individual rights and obligations.”283
Judge Berzon responded to the majority’s argument that the Sandoval and Gonzaga decisions implied that agencies cannot create either private rights of action or enforceable rights by observing that
the Supreme Court had never held that administrative regulations
may not create rights.284 To the contrary, Judge Berzon argued that
the Court’s precedent clearly supported the view that regulations
276. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937; Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737.
277. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 937 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,
286 (2001) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Recent Case, supra note
1, at 737-38.
278. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 938 n.4 (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 286); Recent
Case, supra note 1, at 740.
279. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737.
280. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946-51 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (explaining
the difference between a right and a right of action); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 737-38.
281. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946-51 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); Recent Case,
supra note 1, at 737-38.
282. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 947 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); Recent Case,
supra note 1, at 740.
283. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 955 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Chrysler
Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301-02 (1979)) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 740.
284. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 954-60 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); Recent Case,
supra note 1, at 738 (discussing Judge Berzon’s partial dissent).
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clearly establish rights and are “laws” for purposes of § 1983, at least
where Congress has delegated authority to agencies to promulgate
rules having the force of law.285 After extensively discussing general
administrative law principles, Supreme Court caselaw, and Ninth
Circuit precedent, Judge Berzon concluded that valid federal regulations could easily create “the particular form of rules that we describe as creating ‘rights.’”286 Accordingly, Judge Berzon determined
that valid regulations that have the force and effect of law are “laws”
within the meaning of § 1983 and, therefore, that where regulations
establish individual and specific legal rights, those rights are enforceable under § 1983.287
Judge Berzon’s argument that rights are different from rights of
action is solidly based on the Court’s precedent, including Chevron
and Chrysler.288 If a statute is ambiguous or contains a gap, the
Chevron decision presumes that Congress has implicitly delegated to
the agency interpretive authority to construe the meaning of the
statute, provided that the agency has promulgated a reasonable interpretation of the statute in a rule carrying the force of law.289 Justice Scalia acknowledged in Sandoval that “regulations, if valid and
reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself.”290 Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognized in Chrysler that Congress may
implicitly delegate the authority to define rights to an agency as long
as it is sufficiently clear that the legislature intended to delegate to
the agency the authority to issue regulations having the force of
law.291

285. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946-60 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (citing Chrysler, 441 U.S. at 308); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 738.
286. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 946-59 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part); Recent Case,
supra note 1, at 738.
287. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 960-61 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (“Applying the
Chrysler presumption, ‘laws’ in § 1983 includes regulations as well.”); Recent Case, supra
note 1, at 738. Judge Berzon concluded, however, that the Title VI disparate impact regulations in the case did not establish an individual right enforceable under § 1983. Save Our
Valley, 335 F.3d at 963 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (“Applying Gonzaga to [49 C.F.R.] §
21.5(b)(2) [(2003)], I conclude that the regulation does not create a separate right in the affected group of people.”).
288. See supra notes 279-87, 289-91 and accompanying text.
289. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001) (stating that courts will
defer to agency statutory interpretation where the statute is ambiguous and the agency
has issued an interpretation in a rule carrying force of law); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) (stating that courts will defer to an
agency rule interpreting an ambiguous statute or a statute containing a “gap” based on the
presumption that Congress has implicitly delegated interpretive authority to the agency);
Recent Case, supra note 1, at 741; supra notes 21-23, 187-93 and accompanying text.
290. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001); Recent Case, supra note 1, at
741.
291. See Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1997) (explaining that Congress
does not need to be “specific before regulations promulgated pursuant to [a congressional
delegation of authority] can be binding on courts in a manner akin to statutes” as long as
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The majority’s conclusion that administrative agencies may establish neither rights of action nor any type of individual right enforceable through § 1983 is based on an overly broad reading of dicta in
Sandoval and Gonzaga.292 In Sandoval, the Court concluded that the
separation of powers doctrine requires that Congress must intend to
create any private rights of action in the federal courts because Congress alone defines federal jurisdiction and, accordingly, that regulations alone may not create a private right of action.293 Congress, however, has explicitly enacted § 1983 to provide remedies for violations
that deprive individuals of their rights under federal law, and therefore § 1983 suits are fully authorized by Congress under separation
of powers principles.294 As discussed below, Chevron and subsequent
cases firmly establish that Congress may delegate to agencies the authority to define rights that carry the force of law and, hence, are enforceable under § 1983.295
The majority also appeared to rely on dicta in the Sandoval decision suggesting that only explicit statutory language may create a
private right of action.296 However, any implication in Sandoval that
only express statutory language may establish a private right of action is contrary to the Court’s prior precedent, and Sandoval never
purported to overrule that precedent.297 The Sandoval decision did
“the reviewing court [is] reasonably . . . able to conclude that the grant of authority contemplates the regulations issued”); see also Recent Case, supra note 1, at 741 & n.58.
292. Recent Case, supra note 1, at 738-42.
293. See Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 953 (Berzon, J., dissenting in part) (“The special
separation of powers concerns underlying Sandoval do not apply in a § 1983 case.”); Recent
Case, supra note 1, at 738-41 (arguing that Sandoval’s requirement that private right of
action suits must be expressly authorized by Congress reflects separation of powers concerns not applicable to enforcement of regulations under § 1983). See generally Sandoval,
532 U.S. at 287-93 (concluding that only Congress and not agencies may create a private
right of action); Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990) (observing that the
need for proof of congressional intent to authorize an implied private right of action “reflects a concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts
controls the availability of remedies for violations of statutes”).
294. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 n.9 (“Because § 1983 provides an ‘alternative source of
express congressional authorization of private suits,’ these separation of powers concerns
are not present in a § 1983 case.” (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)) (citation omitted)); see also Mank, Using § 1983,
supra note 1, at 322-24, 326, 354-57 (arguing § 1983 suits do not raise same separation of
powers concerns as implied right of action suits because Congress has specifically authorized § 1983 suits to enforce federal laws creating individual rights); Sunstein, supra note
49, at 415 (“[I]f Congress itself has created the cause of action, it cannot be argued that judicial enforcement is illegitimate judicial lawmaking.”); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 73840 (arguing that § 1983 suits do not raise the same separation of powers concerns as implied right of action suits because Congress has specifically authorized § 1983 suits to enforce federal laws creating individual rights).
295. See infra Part VII.
296. See supra notes 213-33, 292 and accompanying text; Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1461.
297. Sara Rosenbaum & Joel Teitelbaum, Civil Rights Enforcement in the Modern
Healthcare System: Reinvigorating the Role of the Federal Government in the Aftermath of
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not reject implied rights of action in all circumstances but held only
that Title VI disparate impact regulations that exceed Section 601’s
prohibition against intentional discrimination may not establish a
private right of action.298 Even though Section 601 does not explicitly
provide such a right of action, the Sandoval decision recognized that,
in light of Cannon and Guardians, Section 601 creates an implied
right of action for victims of intentional discrimination.299 Thus,
Sandoval did not hold that a private right of action must always be
explicit in the text of a statute, and it acknowledged that the Court
would recognize implicit rights of action if there is sufficient evidence
in the statute that Congress intended to create a private right of action.300
The Sandoval decision itself acknowledged that a private plaintiff
may file an implied right of action suit under Section 601 of Title VI
alleging intentional discrimination despite the absence of express
statutory authorization for such suits. Similarly, the Court has recognized a cause of action under Title IX for sexual harassment even
though the statute does not explicitly prohibit such conduct because
such suits are consistent with the statute’s core prohibition against
intentional sex discrimination.301 Additionally, the Court has held
that under Title IX a student may sue school officials for deliberate
indifference concerning her complaints of sexual harassment by
other students even though the statute contains no explicit provision
authorizing such a private right of action.302
B. The First Circuit in Rolland v. Romney Considers Agency
Regulations in Defining Rights Under § 1983
1. Nursing Home Reform Amendments (“NHRA”) to the Medicaid
Law Require States to Provide Specialized Services
Most recently, after the Supreme Court decided Gonzaga, the
First Circuit, in Rolland v. Romney,303 relied on regulations in interpreting the scope of statutory rights.304 A class of developmentally
Alexander v. Sandoval, 3 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 215, 244 (2003) (arguing that
Sandoval implies that a private right of action must be based on explicit statutory language, but contending that such a view is contrary to precedent).
298. Black, supra note 1, at 363 & n.42; supra notes 217-29 and accompanying text.
299. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 279-81 (citing Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293
(1985), and Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n of New York City, 463 U.S. 582, 610-11
(1983)); Short, supra note 32, at 125-26.
300. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-87; supra notes 292-99 and accompanying text.
301. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 639-49 (1999); Gebser v.
Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998); Black, supra note 1, at 362-63 (discussing Davis and Gebser).
302. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639-49; see also Black, supra note 1, at 362-63.
303. 318 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2003).
304. Id. at 48-58.
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disabled and mentally retarded residents living in Massachusetts
nursing homes filed suit against the Commonwealth of Massachusetts in federal district court in 1998 “on behalf of a putative class of
approximately 1600 similarly disabled residents of Massachusetts
nursing homes, alleging violations of a variety of federal statutes, including 42 U.S.C. § 1396r, a part of the Nursing Home Reform
Amendments (“NHRA”) to the Medicaid law.”305 Initially, the Commonwealth entered into a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs,
which obligated the state to provide specialized services under
NHRA to the Medicaid law, but the plaintiffs then filed a motion for
further relief under § 1983 concerning specialized services.306 The
plaintiff-residents sought various forms of relief but, in particular,
requested an injunction requiring the Commonwealth to provide
them with “specialized services,” a term given a specialized meaning
in the NHRA and its implementing regulations.307 The United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts ordered the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to provide specialized services and implement a policy of active treatment.308 The state appealed. The First
Circuit Court of Appeals in Romney held that (1) states are required
to provide specialized services to persons found to require both nursing facility care and specialized services for mental illness or mental
retardation; (2) the residents had a private right of action under §
1983 to enforce that entitlement; and (3) the district court’s injunction requiring the state to implement a policy of “active treatment”
for mentally retarded residents needing specialized services was
proper.309 The First Circuit concluded that developmentally disabled
and mentally retarded nursing home residents who were entitled to
specialized services under the NHRA of the Medicaid law had a private right of action to enforce those rights in an action under § 1983,
although federal Medicaid funding is not specifically conditioned
upon the provision of specialized services, because the term “specialized services” is a specific right suitable to judicial enforcement and
the NHRA unambiguously binds the states.310

305. Id. at 47-52 (finding that states are required under the Nursing Home Reform
Amendments (NHRA) to the Medicaid law to provide specialized services to certain individuals who require services for mental illness or retardation as well as nursing facility
care).
306. Id. at 44-45.
307. Id. at 45.
308. Rolland v. Celluci, 198 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D. Mass. 2002); Romney, 318 F.3d at 45.
309. 318 F.3d at 48-58.
310. Id. at 44-48 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 1983, various provisions of the Social Security
Act, and applicable regulations).
311. Id. at 48-49.
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The Romney court concluded that the statutory scheme as a whole
supported the HHS regulations.311 In interpreting the statute, the
court initially stated that “the plain meaning of the statutory language, as derived from the whole of the statute, including its overall
policy and purpose, controls.”312 The court concluded that the statute,
when read as a whole and in light of the HHS regulations, demonstrated an intent to create rights on behalf of dual need patients:313
Applying these precepts to the question of whether Congress intended to require states to provide specialized services to dual
need residents, we look first at the NHRA’s plain language. The
NHRA is silent on this precise question, but we gather clues of
congressional intent from several separate provisions in the statute, ever mindful of its overriding purpose, to protect individuals
from being warehoused in nursing facilities and denied necessary
services.314

Examining the statute’s structure, the First Circuit initially concluded that “although the NHRA does not specify states’ obligations
to provide specialized services to dual need residents, it does explicitly require states to provide specialized services to residents who do
need them but who do not require nursing facility care.”315 In light of
the statute’s overall structure, the First Circuit determined “[i]t is
clear that the statute’s intent in this regard was not to elevate those
individuals with only the need for specialized services above those
with dual needs, but rather to bring them up to par with the dual
needs group.”316 Additionally, Congress required states to establish a
screening process for current and potential residents to examine both
“whether nursing facility care is required and whether specialized
services are required.”317 While not conclusive, the requirement of a
screening process suggests that Congress intended states to actually
provide the services that the screening indicated that a resident
needed.318 Furthermore, the First Circuit found that “[a] third statutory clue to Congress’s intent can be discerned in the requirement
that states create an appeals process for individuals adversely impacted by the outcome of any PASARR screening determination. It is
clear that Congress perceived the screening as vesting individuals
with rights to the services deemed necessary . . . .”319
312. Id. at 48 (citing Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. v. Leroux, 69 F.3d 608, 610 (1st Cir.
1995)).
313. Id. at 48-51.
314. Id. at 48 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 100-391, pt. 1, at 459 (1987), reprinted in 1987
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2313-1, 2313-279).
315. Id. at 48-49.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 49.
318. Id.
319. Id. (citation omitted).
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Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Save Our Valley, the First Circuit in
Romney relied in part on the interpretation of the agency responsible
for the NHRA’s implementation, Health and Human Services (HHS).
The First Circuit initially found that
Congress gave the Secretary very broad duties under the
NHRA . . . . Specifically, Congress required the Secretary to oversee the PASARR screening process by developing “minimum criteria for States to use in making [screening] determinations . . . and
in permitting individuals adversely affected to appeal such determinations.” Further, the NHRA required the Secretary to specifically monitor state compliance with certain requirements.320

To fulfill these duties, despite the objections of several states, the
Secretary “promulgated a rule explicitly requiring states to provide
specialized services to dual need residents.”321 The First Circuit considered the Secretary’s interpretation in that rule along with its own
interpretation of the statutory language and legislative history in
concluding that the NHRA required states to provide specialized services to dual need residents.322 In light of its own interpretation of the
statute, the First Circuit likely would have found such a right even
in the absence of the HHS rule.
2. The Right to Specialized Services in the NHRA Is Enforceable
Under § 1983
The First Circuit next addressed whether the right to specialized
services that both it and the HHS regulations found in the NHRA is
enforceable under § 1983. In light of Sandoval and Gonzaga, the
First Circuit observed that the crucial issue is whether Congress intended to create a private right for nursing home residents to receive
specialized services.323 The First Circuit echoed the Supreme Court’s
statement in Cannon v. University of Chicago324 by maintaining that
the most crucial factor in determining whether Congress intended to
create a cause of action is whether the statute contains “‘right-or
duty-creating language.’”325
In determining whether the NHRA contains “right-or-dutycreating language,” the First Circuit considered the HHS regulations. Quoting Sandoval, the First Circuit acknowledged that a regulation “‘may not create a right that Congress has not.’”326 Even after
320. See id. at 50 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1396(f)(8)(A), (B)) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
321. Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 483.116(b)).
322. See id. at 50-51.
323. See id. at 51-52.
324. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
325. See Romney, 318 F.3d at 52 (quoting Cannon, 441 U.S. at 690 n.13).
326. Id. at 52 (quoting Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 291 (2001)).
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Sandoval, however, the Eleventh Circuit had concluded that “regulations that merely interpret a statute may provide evidence of what
private rights Congress intended to create.”327 Citing Wright, which
had in turn cited Chevron, the Romney court concluded that regulations that interpret what rights Congress intended to create in a
statute are “entitled to some deference.”328
Reviewing the statute’s language, its legislative history, and its
interpretation by HHS, the First Circuit concluded that the NHRA
contained “rights-creating” language that established an enforceable
right under § 1983. The Romney court applied the three-part Blessing test to decide whether the statute’s provision for “specialized services” created an enforceable right under § 1983. The Commonwealth
had conceded that Congress intended the statute to benefit especially
persons such as the residents and, therefore, that the NHRA met the
first part of the Blessing test for an enforceable right.329
Relying on Gonzaga, the Commonwealth contended, however, that
the statute’s reference to “specialized services” was too vague and
amorphous to be judicially enforceable and, accordingly, did not meet
the second Blessing prong.330 The First Circuit relied on the HHS
definition of specialized services in determining that the NHRA’s reference to “specialized services” was clear enough to be enforced under the second Blessing standard because Congress had expressly
delegated authority to the HHS Secretary to define the term and the
HHS regulations provided the necessary clarity.331
In the instant case, the NHRA expressly delegates authority to
define “specialized services” and the Secretary has complied. The
agency’s definition, consistent with rights affirmed in prior case
law, provides contextual guidance, and it is sufficient to allow
residents to understand their rights to services, states to understand their obligations, and courts to review states’ conduct in fulfilling those obligations. In complex areas such as this, more cannot reasonably be expected.332

Finally, the First Circuit concluded that the NHRA unambiguously requires states to provide specialized services and, therefore,
meets the third Blessing test.333 The statute repeatedly stated that
states “must” screen potential residents to determine if they need
327. Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1354 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Sandoval,
532 U.S. at 284).
328. See Romney, 318 F.3d at 52 (citing Wright v. City of Roanoke Redevelopment &
Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 427 (1987) (citing Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 865 (1985));
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984)).
329. See Romney, 318 F.3d at 52-53.
330. Id. at 53-54.
331. Id. at 54.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 55.
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services, must review whether current residents need such services,
and must consider the results of such screening and reviews in determining how to provide care to patients.334 The Romney court determined that the mandatory language in the NHRA made it enforceable under § 1983 and distinguished it from the discretionary
right against disparate impact discrimination in the Title VI agency
regulations that the Sandoval Court had found did not create a private right of action.
This is not a situation akin to that in Sandoval, where the sole
source of the right at issue was found in the regulations and the
statute did not utilize rights-creating language, limited the
agency’s ability to effectuate individual rights, and focused on the
implementing agency rather than the individuals being protected.335

The First Circuit concluded that “[b]ecause we find that the right
at issue is not vague and amorphous and that the NHRA unambiguously binds the states, we hold that the residents are endowed with a
private right of action, which they may enforce via section 1983.”336
The First Circuit had found that the statute and its legislative history at least implicitly indicated that Congress intended to establish
a right to specialized services.337 Thus, the court found the right to
these services in the statute itself and not the regulations.338 Where
there were gaps in the statute regarding the definition of such services, however, the Romney court relied upon and deferred to the
HHS regulations.
In the complex field of care for mentally retarded individuals and
the related regulation of nursing homes and states, however, Congress has made it clear that the Secretary is to fill in gaps and
provide definition. The products of that delegation of authority, responding to widespread documented problems, provide an effective
manner for care of mentally retarded nursing home residents and
are entitled to deference.339

Accordingly, the First Circuit, in Romney, used the agency’s interpretation to help define the details of a right it had first found that Congress had intended to create in the statute itself.

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

Id.
Id. (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 (2001)).
Id. at 56.
See supra notes 275, 288-89 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 311-19 and accompanying text.
Romney, 318 F.3d at 58.
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VII. CONCLUSION
In Save Our Valley, the Ninth Circuit reached the erroneous conclusion that administrative regulations can never establish rights enforceable through § 1983 by misreading dicta in Sandoval and Gonzaga.340 Instead, the Court’s precedent in Chevron and Wright supports the view that Congress may delegate to an agency the authority to promulgate rules that help interpret, define, and clarify details
in a statute so that implicit rights in a statute become sufficiently
definite to be enforceable through § 1983.341 Under Chevron, there is,
in effect, a rebuttable presumption that an agency’s rulemaking authority includes the authority to interpret statutes and thus define
rights.342
The Save Our Valley court misread Sandoval and Gonzaga in concluding that agency regulations can never establish rights enforceable through § 1983.343 The Sandoval Court’s emphasis that only
Congress may create a private right of action is based on separation
of powers principles that are inapplicable in § 1983 cases.344 Because
Congress explicitly authorized § 1983 suits to remedy violations of
specific federal rights by state actors, Congress has met separation of
powers requirements for such suits.345 As a private right of action
case, Sandoval simply does not apply to rights enforceable through §
1983.346 Although the Gonzaga Court to some extent shared the
Sandoval Court’s concern that courts should only enforce rights that

340. See supra notes 270-80, 292 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 21-23, 186-93, 289 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 21-23, 186-93, 289 and accompanying text.
343. Recent Case, supra note 1, at 738 n.38.
344. See Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 509 n.9 (1990) (observing that the
need for proof of congressional intent to authorize implied private right of action “reflects a
concern, grounded in separation of powers, that Congress rather than the courts controls
the availability of remedies for violations of statutes”); Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit,
335 F.3d 932, 953 (9th Cir. 2003) (Berzon, J., dissenting in part).
345. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509 n.9 (“Because § 1983 provides an ‘alternative source of
express congressional authorization of private suits,’ these separation of powers concerns
are not present in a § 1983 case.”) (quoting Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea
Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)) (citation omitted); see also Mank, Using § 1983, supra note 1, at 322-24, 326, 354-57 (arguing that § 1983 suits do not raise the same separation of powers concerns as implied right of action suits because Congress has specifically
authorized § 1983 suits to enforce federal laws creating individual rights); Sunstein, supra
note 49, at 415 (“[I]f Congress itself has created the cause of action, it cannot be argued
that judicial enforcement is illegitimate judicial lawmaking.”); Recent Case, supra note 1,
at 738-40.
346. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 300 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing majority’s decision was “something of a sport” because “[l]itigants who in the future
wish to enforce the Title VI regulations against state actors in all likelihood must only reference § 1983 to obtain relief”); Recent Case, supra note 1, at 739 (arguing that Sandoval
only addressed private rights of action and not § 1983 suits). See generally Mank, Using §
1983, supra note 1, at 348-53, 367-82 (arguing that Title VI disparate impact regulations
may be enforced through § 1983).
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Congress intended to create,347 administrative agency regulations
that have the force of law are by their very nature based on at least
an implicit delegation by Congress to the agency to establish rights
and, accordingly, at least in some circumstances may be enforced
through § 1983.348
The First Circuit in Romney appropriately considered the agency’s
interpretation in defining the scope of a statutory right. Although the
statute did not explicitly state that nursing home residents had a
right to specialized services, the First Circuit concluded that the
statutory language as a whole and the legislative history demonstrated that Congress had intended to create a right to specialized
services in the NHRA. The Commonwealth argued that any such
“right” in the statute was too vague and ambiguous to enforce because the statute does not adequately define the term “specialized
services,” but the Romney court concluded that Congress had expressly delegated to HHS the task of defining the details of which
services are required by the right to “specialized services” and that
the regulations gave sufficient clarity to the definition of the term. As
demonstrated by the Romney decision, courts should consider agency
interpretations in deciding whether Congress created a right in a
statute that is sufficiently clear to meet the three-part Blessing standard. The Romney decision illustrates the realities of modern administrative statutes in which Congress creates a general right and then
delegates to an agency the task of filling in the often highly technical
details of that right. If there is sufficient evidence in a statute and its
legislative history that Congress intended to create a mandatory
right on behalf of a defined group of beneficiaries, courts should enforce that right through § 1983 even if an agency has filled some gaps
in the details of that right. That is an example of the agency serving
as the “sorcerer’s apprentice but not the sorcerer himself”349 and is
consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach in both Sandoval and
Gonzaga.

347. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 283 (2002); Mank, The Future After Gonzaga,
supra note 1, at 1446-51.
348. See generally Mank, The Future After Gonzaga, supra note 1, at 1467-69; supra
notes 157-347 and accompanying text.
349. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291.

